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Bridging the Objective/Subjective 
Divide
Towards a Meta-Perspective of Science and Experience
Jonathan Schooler
In this paper I use the thesis that perspective shifting can fundamentally alter
how we evaluate evidence as the backdrop for exploring the perennial challenge
of bridging the divide between the subjective first-person perspective of experi-
ence, and the objective third-person perspective of science. I begin by suggesting
that reversible images provide a metaphor for conceptualizing how the very same
situation can be understood from two very different perspectives that appear to
produce seemingly irreconcilable accounts of their contents. However, when one
recognizes that both views are different vantages on some deeper structure,  a
meta-perspective can emerge that potentially offers a vantage by which the op-
posing perspectives can be reconciled. Building on this notion of a meta-perspect-
ive, I outline a framework for conceptualizing how science can draw on individuals’
first-person experience in order to explicate those experiences within the neces-
sarily third-person perspective of science. I then show how this approach can illu-
minate one of the most private yet ubiquitous aspects of mental life: mind-wan-
dering. Finally and most speculatively, I attempt to tackle the enduring ontolo-
gical tensions that emerge from the disparities between the first- versus third-per-
son perspectives. Specifically, I suggest that the present prevailing third-person
perspective of material reductionism fails to adequately account for the first-per-
son experience of subjectivity, the flow of time, and the present. While I argue
that these differences are an intrinsic property of each perspective, and thus irre-
concilable from the vantage of either, I raise the possibility of a meta-perspective
in which these clashes might be better accommodated. Toward this end, I specu-
latively suggest that experience, the flow of time, and the unique quality of “now”
might be accommodated by the postulation of a subjective dimension or dimen-
sions of time.
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1 Introduction
I am the proud owner of a philosopher’s stone.
Although it does not hold any of the mysterious
powers  (e.g.,  turning  lead  to  gold,  providing
endless youth) that the alchemists attributed to
its namesake, I nevertheless feel its title fitting,
as it offers some rather deep insights into the
importance  of  perspective  in  defining  what
seems true. What distinguishes my stone from
an ordinary river rock is that it has engraved
upon it  the  statement  “Nothing  is  written  in
stone.” In pondering its irony, I’ve come to real-
ize that my philosopher’s stone can be viewed
in at least three ways, each leading to a differ-
ent accounting of its merit. From one vantage
the  statement  on  the  stone  is  self-evidently
false, as clearly revealed by where it is carved.
Schooler, J. (2015). Bridging the Objective/Subjective Divide - Towards a Meta-Perspective of Science and Experience.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 34(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570405 1 | 40
www.open-mind.net
From another  it  is  demonstrably  true,  as  the
word “nothing” is written in stone right there.
Finally,  the  fact  that  the  presentation  of  the
stone’s message simultaneously reveals it to be
both true and not true enables the stone to cla-
rify  the  paradoxical  essence  of  its  meaning.
Nothing is definitive because a change in per-
spective may shift what is seen as factual. How-
ever, the stone further illustrates that when one
recognizes how the perspectives that one takes
influence  the  conclusions  that  one  draws,  one
gains a larger meta-perspective that can accom-
modate them both.
Although it is relatively straightforward to
describe the manner in which my philosopher’s
stone conveys how shifting perspective can alter
what is seen as true, such descriptions do not
do justice to the impact the stone has when one
actually encounters it. The stone not only con-
veys  its  message,  it  embodies  it.  Its  message
thus speaks not only to one’s capacities of logic
but  also  viscerally,  physically,  through  one’s
senses. Indeed this difference between the third-
person  account  of something and the first-per-
son experience of it is perhaps the ultimate ex-
ample of the manner in which perspective can
alter how we understand the world. 
In this paper I attempt to nudge the field
towards a rapprochement between the subject-
ive  first-person  perspective  of  experience  and
the  objective  third-person  perspective  of  sci-
ence.  My efforts  are divided into three  some-
what distinct sections; all united by the goal of
illustrating how the divide between the subject-
ive and objective might begin to be bridged by
a  broader  perspective  that  acknowledges  that
while neither can be reduced to the other, they
may be alternative vantages of a larger meta-
perspective. 
In the first section, I use the analogy of re-
versible images to emphasize the importance of
perspective  shifting  in  recognizing  that  views
that seem one way from one perspective may
seem  quite  different  from  another.  However,
when one recognizes that both views are differ-
ent vantages on some deeper structure, a meta-
perspective can emerge that potentially offers a
vantage by which the opposing perspectives can
be  reconciled.  I  propose  that  the  relationship
between the first-person perspective of subject-
ive experience and the third-person perspective
of  objective  science  can  be  conceptualized  in
this  manner,  and  that  at  least  some  of  the
heated  debate  between  scholars  on  this  topic
may  stem from their  exclusively  favoring  one
vantage over the other. 
In the second section, I illustrate how the
third-person  perspective  of  science  can  both
draw on and elucidate first-person experiences,
and in particular the ubiquitous internal state
of  mind-wandering.  I  argue  that  although
people’s self-reports of private internal experi-
ences  such as mind-wandering necessarily rely
on  a  re-representation  of  the  experience  to
themselves (meta-awareness), we can neverthe-
less draw inferences about their underlying ex-
perience by examining the relationship between
self-reports  and  physiological  and  behavioral
measures. Triangulation between these measures
has highlighted both the strengths and limita-
tions of people’s meta-awareness of their drift-
ing minds: although people frequently fail to no-
tice that their minds are wandering, when quer-
ied they are quite accurate at reporting whether
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Figure 1: From one perspective, as evident from the place
onto which it is carved, “Nothing is Written in Stone” is a
contradictory statement. However, from another perspective,
“Nothing” is in fact written in stone, making the statement
true. Thus, “Nothing is Written in Stone” illustrates that
when one recognizes how the perspectives that one takes in-
fluence the conclusions that one draws, one gains a larger
meta-perspective that can accommodate them both.
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or not their minds were on task. This analysis
thus reveals the value of using empirical third-
person science to clarify the nature of first-per-
son experience.
In the  final section I  consider  how first-
person experience may inform our understand-
ing of objective reality. Current views of science
offer no way of accounting for the existence of
subjective experience, the flow of time, or the
privileged  present,  leading  mainstream science
to marginalize these essential elements of con-
sciousness  as  irrelevant  or  illusory.  However,
from my vantage these aspects of existence are
at least as certain as physical reality itself.  It
seems nonsensical to characterize experience as
an illusion, because even an illusory experience
(i.e.,  where  the  contents  have  no  bearing  on
physical reality) is still an experience. Moreover,
experience exclusively resides  in an ever-chan-
ging present. A characterization of reality that
has no place for subjective experience, the flow
of  time,  or  importance  of  the  present  seems
devoid of the core aspects of my existence. In
keeping with others who have speculated that
theories of physical reality will need to be ex-
panded to accommodate subjective experience, I
conjecture  that  consciousness  may  correspond
to movement in an additional subjective dimen-
sion (or dimensions) of time. Although this hy-
pothesis is highly speculative, it provides an ex-
ample of the kind of meta-perspective that may
be necessary to successfully accommodate sub-
jective and objective views.
Clearly I have my work cut out for me.
However, before embarking on the more ambi-
tious aspects  of  this  journey,  let  us first  step
back and consider the nature of perspective and
the impact that it can have on understanding.
2 Applying perspective shifts to 
conceptualizing human experience from
the first- versus third-person 
perspective
The striking  parallels  between perceptual  and
conceptual perspective shifts exemplify the em-
bodiment of mental capacities in physical exper-
ience  (Schubert &  Semin 2009).  Colloquially,
when we talk about dramatic shifts in concep-
tual understanding, we routinely use perceptual
metaphors (Schooler et al. 1994). We speak of
“thinking out of the box,” or of “stepping back
and  looking  at  the  bigger  picture.”  Even  the
term that we use for gaining a fresh perspective
on an old problem, i.e.,  “insight,” directly al-
ludes to the parallels  between perceptual  and
conceptual perspective shifting. It is no coincid-
ence that the Gestalt psychologists who pion-
eered  research  on  visual  perspective  shifting
(Wagemans et al. 2012) also were the first to in-
vestigate  the  processes  of  conceptual  insight
(Duncker 1945). And indeed, research in our lab
(Schooler & Melcher 1995) reveals a strong cor-
relation between people’s ability to make per-
ceptual  insights  (e.g.,  recognizing  out-of-focus
pictures) and conceptual insights (e.g., solving
insight word problems). Thus, in order to ex-
plore how perspective may constrain our con-
ceptual understandings, it is helpful to start by
briefly considering the ways in which perspect-
ive can influence perceptual experiences. As will
be  argued,  the  manner  in  which  alternative
first-person  perceptual  perspectives  constrain
our  experiences,  provides  a  compelling  meta-
phor for the broader contrast between first- and
third-person  perspectives  that  individuals  face
in reconciling their personal subjective experi-
ences with objective reality. 
One of  the greatest  challenges of  visual
perspective  is  recognizing  how fluid it  really
is.  Typically,  when  we  view  an  object  or  a
scene, we apprehend it from a particular vant-
age and rarely consider the possibility that it
may be seen in a different way. If and when a
shift occurs, the experience is typically char-
acterized by a marked surprise that the very
same view could afford such a different under-
standing. The Gestalt reversible figures are a
quintessential  example of  images that startle
us with their alternative perspectives. At first
when  we  encounter  them  we  often  perceive
them from only  one  perspective;  that  is,  al-
though  there  are  several  possible  interpreta-
tions of the image, we assign one set of per-
ceptual properties to the elements of the im-
age (front or back, figure or ground), and one
conceptual  interpretation  of  the  object  (e.g.,
duck  or  rabbit,  young  woman  or  old  hag).
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When presented with an image of a duck/rab-
bit as a duck, those unfamiliar with the image
may initially see only a duck. However, if aler-
ted to the possibility of another embedded im-
age, suddenly a rabbit may virtually pop out.
Other classic examples of reversible images in-
clude:  a  Necker  cube  facing  one  way or  an-
other, a vase or a pair of faces, a young wo-
man or an old hag. A particularly compelling
recent addition is the spinning dancer illusion,
where  a  perceptual  shift  not  only  changes
one’s  perspective  of  her  orientation  but  also
the direction in which she appears to be spin-
ning.
There are several  notable  aspects  of  all
the aforementioned visual perspective shifting
examples. First, before one knows that there
are multiple interpretations,  it is common to
only perceive one or the other.  Second, once
one is aware of both perspectives, one can ex-
perience an oscillation between the two, shift-
ing  from  one  perspective  to  the  other,  and
back  again.  Third,  at  any  one  moment  in
time,  it  is  impossible  to  simultaneously  see
both  interpretations.  The  Necker  cube  is
either  seen facing one way or the other;  the
spinning dancer only rotates in one direction
at a time. Finally, although one can only per-
ceive  one  interpretation  at  a  time,  one  can
nevertheless  know that  multiple  perspectives
exist, and this knowledge provides a meta-per-
spective, whereby we appreciate that what we
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Figure 2: The duck-rabbit illusion is a classic example
of  a  perspective-dependent  reversible  image.  When
presented as a duck, those unfamiliar with the image
may initially see only a duck. However, if alerted to the
possibility of another embedded image, suddenly a rab-
bit  may  pop  out.  McManus,  I.  C.,  Freegard,  M.,
Moore, J., & Rawles, R. (2010). Science in the making:
Right hand, left hand. II: The duck–rabbit figure. Lat-
erality, 15, 167. 
Figure  3:  The Necker cube is a reversible image that,
depending on the perspective taken by the observer, ap-
pears to be facing one way or another. Shifting one’s per-
spective allows the observer to view the cube either from
slightly above or slightly below. Necker, L.A. (1832). Ob-
servations on some remarkable optical phenomenon seen
in Switzerland; and on an optical phenomenon which oc-
curs  on  viewing  a  figure  of  a  crystal  or  geometrical
solid. London and Edinburgh Philosophical Magazine and
Journal of Science, 1 (5), 329–337.
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perceive one way at one moment can be per-
ceived in a very different way in the next.
A  particularly  remarkable  class  of  per-
ceptual  shift  that  enables  us  to  switch  to  a
meta-perspective comes from “Magic Eye” ste-
reograms  that  can  reveal  a  full  holographic
three-dimensional  realm  that  is  not  initially
perceptible  at  all.  These  stereograms  entail
images that first are viewed as a two-dimen-
sional  pattern.  However,  if  one stares  at  the
image long enough in just the right way (this
requires a little eye crossing) and believes that
it is possible to actually see into it, an entirely
different  and  fully  three-dimensional  image
emerges. What is so striking about these “Ma-
gic  Eye”  stereograms  is  that  the  embedded
three-dimensional  images  have  absolutely  no
resemblance  to  the  two-dimensional  images
from which they emerge. There is of course a
sophisticated algorithm (based on principles of
stereopsis) that enables the three-dimensional
perception to arise from the two-dimensional
image, but the experiences of the two images
are wholly of a different sort. Those who have
not gotten into a Magic Eye image can have
no idea what the underlying image looks like,
and even if they are shown what the form is,
they cannot appreciate what it is like to actu-
ally witness the two-dimensional page miracu-
lously open up into a three-dimensional world
that is  somehow residing within it. However,
those  who have experienced  this  transforma-
tion  gain  a  wholly  different  appreciation  for
the image, recognizing that it affords two en-
tirely different vantages, even while appreciat-
ing that only one can be apprehended at any
particular time.1
The lessons learned from perceptual per-
spective shifting are relevant to the long-stand-
ing tension between conceptualizing human ex-
perience from the first- versus third-person per-
spective. Not unlike the shifting perspectives of
a reversible image, the field of psychology has
vacillated back and forth between focusing on
people’s  self-reported internal  experiences (the
first-person  perspective)  and  their  observable
behaviors  (the  third-person  perspective).
Moreover, just as the spinning dancer can move
in one direction for a while, then flip back and
forth in direction, and then carry on in the op-
posite direction, the field has had periods of rel-
ative steady focus on one or the other vantage
and  other  periods  in  which  the  vantage  was
more variable. 
1 A possible objection to the Magic Eye stereogram as an illustra-
tion of a shifting perspective is that it can be enabled merely by
a  musculature  action  (the  crossing  of  the  eyes).  One  reviewer
suggested that the new representation that  emerges  from these
images may be no “more interesting than the muscular action of
opening a closed eye which also allows the appearance of a sud-
denly unseen picture.” While a worthwhile observation, I do not
think  it  challenges  the  relevance  of  the  example.  First,  closing
one’s eyes is not a different vantage of an image; it is a lack of a
vantage at all. Second, like other reversible images whose shifting
interpretation  can  be  enhanced  by  movement  of  the  eyes,  the
muscular adaptations required for seeing the alternate image of a
Magic Eye stereogram is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for its reinterpretation. This is illustrated by the fact that many
people, despite all efforts of eye crossing, are incapable of enter-
ing them and that those who do have the good fortune to be of
being able to experience them typically must engage in sustained
cognitive effort to unpack the image once they begin to get into
them. The central point of the Magic Eye example is that it illus -
trates how changing vantages on what one is looking at can pro-
foundly influence what one believes to be true about it. The fact
that this changing vantage may require a little eye crossing does
not, in my view, lessen this observation.
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Figure  4:  Rubin’s vase (sometimes referred to as “The
Two Face, One Vase Illusion”) depicts the silhouette of a
vase in black and the profiles of two inward-looking faces
in white. The figure-ground distinction made by the brain
during visual perception determines which image is seen.
Ittelson, W. H. (1969). Visual Space Perception, Springer
Publishing Company, LOCCCN 60-15818
www.open-mind.net
The inception of  psychology was marked
by a concern with the inner experience of the
individual (Schultz &  Schultz 1992). Introspec-
tion  was  the  tool  of  choice,  and research  en-
tailed asking participants to scrutinize the com-
ponents of their experiences. In short, psycho-
logy began with a fixed first-person perspective.
In fact, it was during this time that psychology
created some of its most robust laws of psycho-
physics  demonstrating strikingly  rigorous rela-
tionships between changes in various perceptual
estimates  (e.g.,  perceived  brightness,  weight,
volume)  and  changes  in  the  physical  stimuli
themselves  (for  a  history,  see  Murray 1993).
Then, concerns about the value of introspection
arose, and researchers began to vacillate regard-
ing the value of introspection relative to more
“objective” third-person perspectives. Although
some researchers (notably the Gestalt psycholo-
gists and other researchers in the domain of hu-
man perception, e.g.,  Katz 1925/1989) contin-
ued to maintain a concern with inner  experi-
ence, for a significant period of time the behavi-
orist  reign caused  a  shift  toward disregarding
people’s  first-person  perspectives.  Internal  ex-
perience was a taboo topic. In short, psychology
switched  to  a  fixed  third-person  perspective.
Then,  with  the  rise  of  information  processing
and the cognitive era, the field again began to
vacillate  back  and  forth  between  considering
people’s  internal  experiences  and  focusing  on
their behavior. 
While psychology again finds itself  in an
age of flipping perspectives about first- versus
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Figure 5: The young girl-old woman illusion (otherwise
known as “My Wife and My Mother-in-Law”) is a revers-
ible  image  in  which  the  viewer  may  either  observe  a
young girl with her head turned to the right or an old
woman with a large nose and protruding chin, depending
on one’s perspective. Wright, E. (1992) The original of E.
G. Boring’s Young Girl/Mother-in-Law drawing and its
relation to the pattern of a joke. Perception, 21, 273–275.
Figure 6: The spinning dancer illusion, or silhouette illu-
sion, depicts a woman spinning in a circle. The direction
of the dancer’s spinning (clockwise or counterclockwise) is
dependent  on  the  perspective  taken  by  the  observer.
Kayahara, Nobuyuki (2003). Silhouette Illusion. ProCreo.
Retrieved from http://www.procreo.jp/labo/labo13.html
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third-person accounts, much consternation still
arises from this fact. Science in general (Wilber
1998)  and  psychology  in  particular  (Wallace
2000) still find it challenging to fully integrate
subjective experience into their  accounts.  Just
as it is impossible to see a Necker cube simul-
taneously facing in its alternative directions, so
too psychology has struggled to reconcile its va-
cillation  between  first-  and  third-person  per-
spectives. On the one hand, ignoring the inner
realm of experience seems to leave out much of
“what it is like” to be human (Nagel 1974). On
the  other  hand,  researchers  are  rightly  con-
cerned  about  the  validity  and  meaning  of
people’s  first-person  reports  (Wilson 2003).
With  no  alternative  window  into  people’s
minds, how can we know that their reports ac-
curately correspond to their  inner experience?
After all, science necessarily relies on mutually
agreed-upon observations. So how can we evalu-
ate the first-person perspective that by its very
nature eludes such consensus? The challenge is
how to translate these first-person experiences
into third-person data that can be scientifically
investigated.  The most  straightforward answer
of course is simply to ask people about their ex-
perience;  their  observable  verbal  statements
thus  become  the  third-  person  window  onto
their first-person experiences. But here we run
up against the challenge that caused psychology
to abandon the first-person perspective in the
first place: How do we know if self-reports line
up with first-person experiences without some
independent measure of people’s internal states
(Bayne this collection)?
Fortunately, self-reports are not the only
third-person window into people’s inner experi-
ence. We can also examine other behaviors as
well as measure physiological and brain activity
in  order  to  make  reasoned  inferences  about
what individuals are genuinely experiencing. In
this  manner,  we  can  begin  to  discern  when
people  are  accurately  characterizing  their  in-
ternal experience, and when they may be over-
looking or distorting key aspects. The approach
that I am advocating here is very much in keep-
ing with Dennett’s notion of heterophenomeno-
logy (2003) that takes at its starting point the
premise that people’s self-reports do not neces-
sarily reflect  what they are actually experien-
cing but rather “what the subject believes to be
true  about  his  or  her  conscious  experience”
(Dennett 2003,  p.  2).  Although  such  an  ap-
proach refrains from necessarily taking people’s
first-person reports on face value,  it  does not
abandon  the  prospect  of  making  inferences
about  what  people  are  actually  experiencing.2
Rather it posits that we must evaluate people’s
self-reports in light of other third-person meas-
ures. As Dennett (1993) puts it:
My suggestion, then, is that if we were to
find real goings-on in people’s brains that
had enough of the ‘defining’ properties of
the  items  that  populate  their  het-
erophenomenological  worlds,  we  could
reasonably propose that we had discovered
what they were really talking about—even
if they initially resisted the identifications.
And if we discovered that the real goings-
on bore only a minor resemblance to the
heterophenomenological  items,  we  could
reasonably  declare  that  people  were  just
mistaken in the beliefs they expressed, in
spite of their sincerity. (p. 95)
As will be argued there are at least some situ-
ations  in  which  external  observers  may  have
better  knowledge  of  a  person’s  internal  state
than  does  the  person  in  question.  Moreover,
there are some mental states (e.g.,  mind-wan-
dering)  for  which  the  crucial  bottleneck  in
people’s introspective awareness stems not from
their  capacity  to  classify  the  experience,  but
rather from the fact that people only intermit-
tently take stock of what is going on in their
own minds. 
In the following section, I review some of
the insights about first-person experience that
can be gained when it is assessed from a third-
2 In the past (Schooler & Schreiber 2004) I characterized Dennett as dis-
missing the notion of underlying experience altogether, noting that he
has written “Nobody is conscious… we are all zombies” (Dennett 1993, p.
406). Although I still find his views on this issue somewhat slippery, I
now believe that he endorses the existence of genuine phenomenal experi-
ence that can be validated with third- person evidence. For example
Dennett (2003) argues  that  evidence about  briefly  presented stimuli
could help to inform subjects about their actual conscious experience ob-
serving “Subjects would learn for the first time that they were, or were
not, conscious of these stimuli” (p. 9). 
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person  perspective.  By adopting  a  “trust  but
verify” approach to first-person reports, we not
only  gain  a  more  objective  understanding  of
subjective  states,  but  also  potentially  glean  a
more astute perspective of our own experience. 
3 Gaining a third-person perspective on 
people’s first-person experience
On some occasions we simply have experiences,
but at other times we reflect on those experi-
ences;  that is,  we intermittently take stock of
our  ongoing  experience  and  re-represent  it  to
ourselves.  This  distinction  between  having  an
experience (experiential consciousness) and ex-
plicitly  re-representing  it  to  ourselves  (meta-
awareness)  is  illustrated  by  the  example  of
mind-wandering while reading (Schooler 2002).
All  of  us have had the  experience  of  reading
along and suddenly realizing that, despite our
best  intentions,  our  eyes  have  been  moving
across the page but our minds have been en-
tirely elsewhere. Indeed this has likely happened
to  a  goodly  proportion  of  the  readers  whom
have made it this far. The immediate question
that this common experience raises is: why do
we continue to simultaneously read and mind-
wander  even  though  we  know  that  it  is  im-
possible to fully do both at the same time? The
answer I  suggest,  and I’ll  offer more evidence
for this contention shortly, is that we routinely
lose  track of  the  contents  of  our  own minds.
People continue mind-wandering while reading
because once they begin to mind-wander they
often  temporarily  fail  to  notice  (i.e.,  become
meta-aware  of)  the  fact  that  their  minds  are
thinking about something unrelated to the text.
The notion that people routinely shift in
perspective  (from  simply  experiencing  to  at-
tempting  to  re-represent  their  experience  to
themselves)  provides  the  foundation  for  a
framework  for  scientifically  investigating  first-
person  experience.  Specifically,  the  distinction
between  experiential  consciousness  and  meta-
awareness  raises  the prospect  of  two types of
dissociations  between  these  vantages  that  are
empirically tractable (Schooler 2002). Temporal
dissociations  of  meta-awareness involve  situ-
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Figure  7:  “Magic  Eye”  stereograms  can  reveal  a  holo-
graphic three dimensional realm that is not initially percept-
ible at all. Consisting of abstract visual patterns constructed
from an algorithm based on the principles  of  stereopsis,
“Magic Eye” illusions require the viewer to blur their vision
for a period of time, thereby revealing a three-dimensional
imprint  once  perspective  has shifted.  Image  provided  by
eyetricks.com Additional  examples  can  be  found  at
http://www.magiceye.com/3dfun/stwkdisp.shtml. 
Figure 8: The three-dimensional image is a three dimen-
sional  yin-yang  which  the  original  Magic  Eye  image
would not have revealed without a shift in perspective.
The embedded three dimensional image has absolutely no
resemblance to the two dimensional image from which it
emerges. Image provided by eyetricks.com.
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ations in which individuals engage in an experi-
ence without explicitly realizing that they are
doing so. The example of temporarily failing to
notice  that  one  is  mind-wandering  is  an  ex-
ample  of  a  temporal  dissociation.  Translation
dissociations of meta-awareness occur when one
distorts or otherwise mischaracterizes their ex-
perience  to  themselves.  Shouting  “I  am  not
angry” at the top of one’s lungs is an example
of this latter dissociation. In the following dis-
cussion I briefly outline the empirical approach
for exploring these two types of dissociations.
3.1 Temporal dissociations of meta-
awareness 
Although failing to notice that one is mind-wan-
dering is a particularly apt example of a tem-
poral dissociation of meta-awareness, there are
numerous  other  examples  of  experiences  that
can temporarily go without being explicitly no-
ticed, including unnoticed emotions (Lambie &
Marcel 2002;  Schooler &  Mauss 2010)  sup-
pressed thoughts (Baird et al. 2013), and vari-
ous  mindless  behaviors  (Schooler et  al. in
press).  Temporal  dissociations  of  meta-aware-
ness readily lend themselves to empirical invest-
igation. Two approaches have proven effective in
delineating situations in which people temporar-
ily fail to notice a particular mental state: self-
catching versus probe-catching and retrospect-
ive measures (Schooler et al. 2011). 
The  self-catch/probe-catch  methodology
pits two common self-report techniques against
one another. Participants are asked to indicate
every time they notice a particular mental state
(e.g., mind-wandering). If an individual reports
that they have just noticed themselves engaging
in that mental state, then this is by definition a
demonstration  that  the  mental  state  has
reached meta-awareness. Thus, self-caught epis-
odes provide a straightforward measure of men-
tal  states  of  which  individuals  have  become
meta-aware. However, within this methodology,
participants also periodically receive experience-
sampling probes (Hurlburt &  Heavey 2001) in
which they are asked whether, at that particu-
lar time, they had been engaging in that mental
state. If people are caught engaging in the state
before they notice it themselves (via self-catch-
ing), this provides a metric of episodes of that
state that have eluded meta-awareness. As will
be detailed later, this approach has proven ef-
fective in documenting temporal dissociations of
a  variety  of  different  mental  states  including
both mind-wandering (Schooler et al. 2004; Say-
ette et  al. 2009;  Sayette et al. 2010) and un-
wanted thoughts (Baird et al. 2013). 
A  second  approach  for  identifying  tem-
poral dissociations of meta-awareness is to rely
exclusively on experience sampling probes (i.e.,
probe-catching)  but  to  additionally  query
people  when  they  are  caught  in  a  particular
state (e.g., mind-wandering) regarding whether
or not they had been previously aware of that
fact.  Again,  as  will  be  seen,  this  strategy
routinely reveals that people can be caught en-
gaging in mental activities that they were previ-
ously experiencing but were not explicitly aware
of. Intriguingly, the findings with this measure
of  temporal  dissociation  align  with  those  re-
vealed by the self-caught/probe-caught method-
ology to reveal consistent systematic differences
between  mental  states  associated  with  meta-
awareness and those that lack it.
3.2 Translation dissociations of meta-
awareness 
Translation  dissociations  correspond  to  situ-
ations in which, while in the process of re-rep-
resentation,  one  omits,  distorts,  or  otherwise
misrepresents  one’s  mental  state  to  oneself
and/or others. The basic strategy for assessing
translation dissociations is to examine the cor-
respondence between individuals’ self-reports of
their mental states and indirect measures that
might reasonably be expected to correspond to
that state (Schooler &  Schreiber 2004). If the
correspondence is high, there is good reason to
think that individuals are accurately reporting
their  internal  state.  If  the  correspondence  is
low,  one needs  to at  least  be  suspicious  that
people are mischaracterizing their mental state. 
Emotions  are  likely  to  be  a  particularly
common source of  translation dissociations.  For
example,  when  individuals  report  experiencing
anxiety, a host of physiological measures (includ-
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ing heart rate and galvanic skin response) typic-
ally become elevated (Marks 1987). Such corres-
pondence gives us confidence that people are ac-
curately  characterizing  their  internal  state;  in
other words, there is no translation dissociation.
However, there is a class of individuals, referred
to as repressors, who show the standard physiolo-
gical changes when put in situations that would
cause most people to experience anxiety, but who
fail to report any change in anxiety (Asendorpf &
Scherer 1983). In these cases, it seems reasonable
to speculate that the repressors are misrepresent-
ing their internal experience to themselves; they
are experiencing anxiety but not acknowledging it
(Lambie & Marcel 2002; Schooler et al. in press).
As another example, consider  that when males
experience  sexual  arousal  they  typically  show
changes in their  penile tumescence (a technical
way of  saying they become erect).  Intriguingly,
men who reported disgust for homosexual activity
were shown to actually exhibit greater increases
in penile tumescence when witnessing males enga-
ging in sex, than men who did not report aversive
feelings  toward  homosexuality  (Adams et  al.
1996). One reasonable account of these findings is
that  these  so-called  homophobics  experience  a
translation dissociation, such that they are unable
to acknowledge the arousal that they feel towards
men, and instead misattribute the experience to a
feeling of disdain.
A  final  example  of  translation  dissoci-
ations  involves  situations in  which  individuals
analyze why they feel the way they do about an
affective experience. For example, in one study
(Wilson et al. 1993), participants viewed various
art posters and then both rated the posters and
selected one to take home with them. Prior to
engaging in this assessment, some participants
were further asked to analyze why they felt the
way they did about the posters, whereas others
were not. When contacted several weeks later,
people  who  had  attempted  to  reflect  on  the
basis of their preferences were less satisfied with
their choice and were less likely to have hung
the poster on their wall than those who had not
analyzed their reasons. The disruptive effects of
analyzing  reasons,  which  have  been  conceptu-
ally replicated in a variety of contexts (Wilson
&  Schooler 1991), suggest that sometimes self-
reflection may be a source of translation dissoci-
ations. That is, in the process of trying to un-
derstand why people feel the way they do, they
may construct a  faulty meta-conscious repres-
entation and thereby lose touch with their feel-
ings.
3.3 Investigating temporal and translation
dissociations of meta-awareness in 
the context of mind-wandering 
In recent years, a growing body of research has
addressed the nature of mind-wandering as it per-
tains to the occurrence of temporal and transla-
tion  dissociations  of  meta-awareness.  This  re-
search  suggests  that  mind-wandering  is  highly
susceptible  to  temporal  dissociations  of  meta-
awareness; that is, individuals routinely fail to no-
tice that their minds are wandering despite the
considerable disruption to performance that such
unnoticed lapses often incur. This claim is sup-
ported by various strands of evidence revealing
the  frequency  with  which  participants  are
routinely  “caught”  mind-wandering  before  they
notice it themselves. In contrast, mind-wandering
appears to be relatively resistant to translation
dissociations  of  meta-awareness.  Although  indi-
viduals regularly fail to notice when their minds
are wandering, when meta-awareness is directed
toward the current state of thought, they are gen-
erally quite accurate in characterizing whether or
not their minds were on-task. This latter claim is
supported  by  numerous  demonstrations  of  sys-
tematic differences in performance and neurocog-
nitive activity as a function of individuals’ self-
classifications  of  their  mental  state  as  on-task
versus mind-wandering. 
3.3.1 On the veracity of self-reports of 
mind-wandering: How susceptible is 
mind-wandering to translation 
dissociations? 
A fundamental challenge to the investigation of
mind-wandering is its necessary reliance on self-
report.  Mind-wandering  is,  by  its  very  nature,
defined in terms of internal mental states. Given
psychology’s long suspicions about introspective
evidence (Nisbett &  Wilson 1977), this reliance
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on self-reports likely contributed to why, until re-
cently, consideration of this important topic was
largely limited to a few stalwart researchers (An-
trobus 1999; Klinger 1999; Singer 1988; Giambra
1995). However,  accumulating evidence suggests
that when individuals are directly queried regard-
ing whether they are mind-wandering, their self-
reports  accurately  reflect  their  internal  mental
state. Evidence for this claim is largely based on
the logic of triangulation (Schooler &  Schreiber
2004). Accordingly, if self-reports of mind-wander-
ing consistently co-vary with behavior and neuro-
cognitive activity in a manner that might reason-
ably be expected to be impacted by mind-wan-
dering,  then  we  can  have  increased  confidence
that  such  introspective  evidence  accurately  re-
flects the underlying mental state. In the follow-
ing review, I detail at some length numerous find-
ings in support of this relationship from a host of
paradigms  in  which  potential  behavioral  or
physiological  proxies  of  mind-wandering are  re-
lated to individuals’ responses to randomly timed
queries regarding whether they were just mind-
wandering. This review provides a review of the
extensive literature on mind-wandering and evid-
ence for the general contentions that: 1) the con-
cordance  between  behavioral  and  physiological
measures  and  self-report  data  indicate  that
people’s  self-reports  of  mind-wandering  corres-
pond to actual instances of this mental state; and
2) while  people are routinely able to recognize
mind-wandering after the fact, they often fail to
notice it while it is occurring. Readers willing to
take my word on these two points may want to
scan or skip this section and jump ahead to its
Summary (on page 16) or to the Implications of
this approach for the more general enterprise of
the  science of  first-person perspective  (on page
18) if the general topic of mind-wandering is not
of primary interest.
3.3.1.1 Behavioral measures
Reading comprehension
Although long overlooked as a source of reading
comprehension  failure,  Schooler et  al. (2004)
found  a  strong  correlation  between  the  fre-
quency of  mind-wandering reports in response
to experience sampling probes and comprehen-
sion  accuracy.  Subsequent  work  demonstrated
that  mind-wandering  specifically  disrupts  the
development  of  a  detailed  situational  model
Smallwood et al. 2008).
Another way in which the absence of read-
ing  comprehension  following  mind-wandering
has been documented is through the examina-
tion of people’s capacity to detect when the text
becomes gibberish. In one study (Zedelius et al.
2014)  participants  were  asked  to  read  simple
children’s texts and report every time they no-
ticed  that  the  sentences  no  longer  made  any
sense (some of the sentences were constructed
so  that  the  nouns  of  the  sentences  were  re-
arranged in  a nonsensical  manner,  e.g.,  “This
sense makes no sentence”). The results revealed
that  participants sometimes continued reading
for a number of sentences before noticing that
the text had become gibberish. Moreover, parti-
cipants who received thought probes after sev-
eral sentences of gibberish were more than twice
as  likely  to  report  mind-wandering  without
meta-awareness,  relative  to  those  who  were
probed at random times.
Eye-movements
If  individuals’  self-reported  mind-wandering
episodes during reading correspond to genuine
mental  lapses,  then  we might  also  reasonably
expect to see differences between the patterns of
gaze durations following periods in which indi-
viduals report reading attentively versus mind-
wandering. These predictions were confirmed in
an experiment in which subjects  read the en-
tirety  of  Jane  Austen’s  Sense  and  Sensibility
while  their  eye  movements  were  recorded
(Reichle et al. 2010). Relative to eye movements
obtained during intervals of normal reading, the
fixations  measured  during  intervals  that  pre-
ceded  reports  of  mindless  reading  were  both
longer in duration and less modulated by vari-
ables that are known to influence fixation dura-
tions (e.g., word frequency, Rayner 1998). These
results  suggest  that  the  fairly  tight  coupling
between the mind and eye during normal read-
ing (Reichle 2006) becomes disengaged during
self-reported mind-wandering. 
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Sustained Attention to Response Task 
(SART)
Another paradigm that has proven effective in
documenting the validity of mind-wandering re-
ports is the SART task. The SART is a simple
go/no-go task in which participants are asked to
refrain from responding to an infrequent no-go
target  (Manly et  al. 1999;  Robertson et  al.
1997). Studies have documented that the brief
lapses associated with this task share important
features  associated  with  reports  of  off-task
thought.  For  example,  individual  difference
measures such as cognitive failures (Smallwood
et  al. 2004),  depression (Carriere et  al. 2008;
Farrin et al. 2003; Smallwood et al. 2007), and
poor executive control (McVay &  Kane 2009)
have been associated both with greater mind-
wandering  reports  and  more  errors  on  the
SART. Similarly, both off-task reports and er-
rors in this task share similar information pro-
cessing features in terms of measures such as re-
action  time (RT) and evoked response  poten-
tials (ERPs; Smallwood et al. 2008, 2004, 2007).
3.3.1.2 Neurocognitive measures
Evoked Response Potential
When  the  brain  faces  situations  in  which  it
toggles  between  alternative  perspectives,  it
routinely temporarily inhibits one perspective in
favor of the other. This dampening of the non-
dominant perspective is shown in reversible fig-
ures, where brain activation of one interpreta-
tion is inhibited while the other is consciously
experienced (Tong et al. 2006). This same pro-
cess  of  dampening  the  nondominant  vantage
also appears to operate when people favor their
internal train of thought over external events.
Accordingly, reports of mind-wandering should
be associated with a dampening of attention to
external stimuli. Indirect support for this “de-
coupling  hypothesis”  comes  from  studies
demonstrating that participants are more prone
to errors during periods associated with self-re-
ported  attentional  drifts  (e.g.,  Carriere et  al.
2008;  Smallwood et al. 2004;  Weissman et al.
2006) and that they are less likely to recollect
external  events  during  these  periods  (Small-
wood et al. 2003, 2007, 2004). 
More  direct  support  for  a  relationship
between  self-reports  of  mind-wandering  and
dampened external processing comes from several
ERP studies.  In  one  study  (Smallwood et  al.
2008), participants intermittently received experi-
ence sampling probes while performing a simple
target discrimination task. Analysis of the ERP
responses to the targets revealed that the amp-
litude of the P3 ERP component elicited by the
targets was significantly reduced for targets asso-
ciated  with  “off-task”  relative  to  “on-task”  re-
ports. Given that the P3 component reflects the
degree to which external  events are cognitively
analyzed (e.g., Donchin & Coles 1988), these ini-
tial data support the proposal that mind-wander-
ing reports are associated with an attenuation in
stimulus processing at relatively late, post-percep-
tual processing stages. 
A  more  recent  ERP  study  examined
whether  mind-wandering  might  also  attenuate
sensory-level  cortical  processing  (Kam et  al.
2011).  Participants  again  performed  a  simple
discrimination  task  (at  fixation)  while  being
prompted at random intervals to report on their
attentional state, but this time we also included
task irrelevant probes in the visual periphery.
The  results  revealed  that  the  initial  sensory-
evoked response to probes was significantly at-
tenuated  prior  to  reports  of  “off-task”  atten-
tional  states,  as  measured  via  the  visual  P1
ERP component. A second experiment that in-
cluded irrelevant auditory probes similarly re-
vealed that sensory-level auditory processing in
the cortex is also dampened during self-reported
“off-task” states, as measured via the auditory
N1 ERP component. Another recent study from
our lab (Baird et al. 2014) replicated the finding
that mind-wandering reduced the P1 ERP, and
further revealed that mind-wandering was asso-
ciated with decreased phase-locking of electro-
encephalograph (EEG) neural oscillatory activ-
ity  to  sensory  stimuli,  suggesting  that  mind-
wandering  disrupts  the  temporal  fidelity  with
which the brain responds to a stimulus.
Taken  together,  the  collective  ERP  and
EEG evidence demonstrates that self-reports of
mind-wandering correspond to attenuated sens-
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ory processing and cognitive  appraisals  of  ex-
ternal stimuli. This finding further confirms the
validity  of  self-reports  of  mind-wandering  and
suggests that a central feature of the mind-wan-
dering state is an attenuation of the processing
of external stimuli. 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) 
One of the challenges facing the burgeoning dis-
cipline of cognitive neuroscience is making sense
of the observation that several brain areas, in-
cluding  the  posterior  parietal  cortex  and  the
precuneus, the medial prefrontal cortex, and the
medial  temporal  lobe  (which  are  collectively
known  as  the  default  mode  network  (DMN),
Raichle et al. 2001), all  exhibit high levels of
activity when participants have no external task
to  perform.  One  candidate  process  that  the
DMN could serve is the generation of the stimu-
lus-independent thoughts that occur during the
mind-wandering state, a hypothesis that is sup-
ported by a growing body of evidence. For ex-
ample, McGuire et al. (1996) used the technique
of  retrospective  thought  sampling  to  demon-
strate that reports of mind-wandering were as-
sociated with activity in the medial prefrontal
cortex. More recently, several studies have docu-
mented that situations associated with greater
mind-wandering reports (as assessed outside of
the  scanner)  also  lead  to  greater  activity  in
many of the key elements of the DMN (Mason
et al. 2007; McKiernan et al. 2006). 
While activity in the DMN is correlated
with high probability of retrospective reported
mind-wandering,  it  was  originally  unclear
whether  particular  episodes  of  self-reported
mind-wandering  are  linked to  recruitment  of
the  DMN.  To  assess  whether  this  was  the
case,  we conducted a study in which experi-
ence sampling was combined with fMRI to as-
sess the neural activity that occurred during
particular episodes of mind-wandering (Chris-
toff et al. 2009). This study revealed that, in
addition  to  the  activation  of  several  core
structures  in  the  DMN,  areas  normally  ob-
served in controlled processing (including the
dorsolateral  prefrontal  cortex  and  the  dorsal
anterior  cingulate)  were  also  engaged during
self-reported off-task thought. This pattern of
brain  activation  suggests  that  executive  and
default network resources are jointly recruited
during episodes of mind-wandering. One pos-
sible account explaining this joint activation is
that executive network resources play a role in
transforming  the  self-referential  content  sup-
ported by the DMN into the internal train of
thought  that  we  experience  when  the  mind
wanders.  Further  support for this  hypothesis
is provided by evidence that the ability to en-
gage  in  autobiographical  planning  (such  as
“how do I get out of debt?”) requires coopera-
tion between the DMN and a system involving
attentional control (Spreng et al. 2010).
Christoff et al. (2009) also compared the
pattern  of  activations  associated  with  intro-
spective reports of mind-wandering, on the one
hand and the pattern of activations associated
with behavioral errors, on the other hand. Al-
though a variety of factors are known to con-
tribute to behavioral errors during the SART,
mind-wandering is believed to be one important
source of such errors. Consistent with this view,
SART errors  (Figure  9)  and the introspective
reports of mind-wandering (Figure 10) were as-
sociated with similar patterns of brain recruit-
ment, providing further validation for the use of
introspective  experience  sampling  reports  for
the study of mind-wandering.
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Figure 9: Activations preceding reports of mind wan-
dering (off-task versus on-task). Upward green arrows:
default network regions; downward blue arrows: execut-
ive network regions. Regions of activation included (A)
Dorsal  ACC  (BA32);  (B)  Ventral  ACC  (BA  24/32);
(C) Precuneus (BA7); (D) Left temporoparietal junc-
tion  (BA  39);  (E)  Bilateral  DLPFC (BA 9).  Height
threshold P<0.005, extent threshold k>5 voxels (from
Christoff et al. 2009). 
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3.3.2 The intermittent meta-awareness of 
mind-wandering: How susceptible is 
mind-wandering to temporal 
dissociations? 
Although when queried individuals are quite re-
liable in their capacity to self-report whether or
not  they  were  mind-wandering,  a  variety  of
strands  of  evidence  suggest  that  people
routinely  fail  to  spontaneously  notice  when
mind-wandering takes place. Two paradigms, re-
viewed earlier,  have documented the intermit-
tent meta-awareness of mind-wandering.
3.3.2.1 Self-caught/probe-caught 
methodology
One approach for documenting mind-wandering
in  the  absence  of  meta-awareness  is  combining
self-catching  and  experience  sampling  measures
into a single paradigm. Recall that the self-catch-
ing measure asks participants to press a response
key every time they notice for themselves that
they  have  been  mind-wandering.  This  measure
provides  a  straightforward  assessment  of  the
mind-wandering episodes that have reached meta-
awareness. The experience sampling measure, on
the other hand, randomly probes people regard-
ing whether they were at that particular moment
mind-wandering. When used in conjunction with
the self-caught measure, experience sampling can
catch people mind-wandering before they notice it
themselves.
A number of studies have effectively used
the self-caught/probe-caught methodology to il-
luminate the relationship between mind-wander-
ing and meta-awareness. This approach was ini-
tially  used  to  examine  mind-wandering  while
reading (Schooler et al. 2004) and revealed that
whereas  participants  regularly  caught  them-
selves  mind-wandering,  they  nevertheless  were
often  caught  mind-wandering  by  the  probes.
Strikingly, and in support of a fundamental dif-
ference between mind-wandering episodes that
are accompanied by meta-awareness and those
that  are  not,  there  was  a  strong  correlation
between  probe-caught  mind-wandering  and
comprehension  performance  but  no  such  rela-
tionship  between  self-caught  mind-wandering
and comprehension. 
Additional studies have examined the im-
pact of two mind-altering experiences hypothes-
ized to undermine individuals’ meta-awareness:
alcohol  intoxication  and  cigarette  craving.  In
one study (Sayette et al. 2009), social drinkers
consumed  a  moderate  dose  of  alcohol  or  a
placebo beverage and then performed a reading
task (implementing  a  self-caught/probe-caught
mind-wandering  assessment  methodology).
Compared with those who drank the placebo,
participants who drank alcohol were more likely
to  report  that  they  were  “zoning  out”  when
probed.  After  accounting  for  this  increase  in
mind-wandering, alcohol also lowered the prob-
ability of catching oneself zoning out (i.e., self-
catching). These data suggest that alcohol in-
creases  mind-wandering  while  simultaneously
reducing the likelihood of noticing one’s mind-
wandering. 
In  another  study  (Sayette et  al. 2010),
smokers,  who  were  either  nicotine-deprived
(crave  condition)  or  non-deprived  (low-crave
condition), performed the same mind-wandering
task used in  Sayette et al. (2009). Smokers in
the cigarette-crave condition were significantly
more likely than the low-craving smokers to ac-
knowledge that their mind was wandering when
they  were  probed.  When  this  more-than-
threefold increase in zoning out was accounted
for,  craving  also  lowered  the  probability  of
catching oneself mind-wandering. Similar to the
alcohol consumption findings, it appears that ci-
Schooler, J. (2015). Bridging the Objective/Subjective Divide - Towards a Meta-Perspective of Science and Experience.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 34(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570405 14 | 40
Figure 10: Activations preceding SART errors (interval prior
to incorrect versus correct targets).  Upward green arrows: de-
fault network regions; downward blue arrows: executive net-
work  regions.   Regions  of  activation  included:  (F)  Ventro-
medial  PFC  (BA10/11);  (G)  Dorsomedial  PFC  (BA9).
Height threshold P<0.005, extent threshold k>5 voxels (from
Christoff et al. 2009). 
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garette craving simultaneously increases mental
lapses  while  reducing  the  metacognitive  capa-
city to notice them. 
3.3.2.2 Retrospective classification of 
mind-wandering episodes
A second methodology that has been used to ex-
amine  fluctuations  in  meta-awareness  of  mind-
wandering  entails  combining  the  experiential
sampling methodology with a judgment of parti-
cipants’ immediately prior state of awareness. Re-
call that, in the experience sampling procedure,
participants are intermittently queried regarding
whether or not they were mind-wandering; in this
combined approach, if they report mind-wander-
ing to the probe, then they are also asked to in-
dicate if they were aware that they were mind-
wandering.  In  response  to  such  queries,  parti-
cipants routinely indicate that they had been un-
aware of their mind-wandering up until the time
of the probe. Moreover, when participants classify
mind-wandering episodes as unaware, their per-
formance and neurocognitive activity systematic-
ally differ from when they report having realized
they were mind-wandering.
Consistent  with  findings  using  the  self-
caught/probe-caught  methodology,  retrospective
classifications  of  unaware  mind-wandering  epis-
odes  (termed  zoning  out)  and  aware  episodes
(termed tuning out), indicate that the former are
more associated with comprehension failures than
the latter (Smallwood et al. 2008). By contrast,
reports  of  zoning out  seem to be  most  closely
linked to failures in response inhibition (Small-
wood et al. 2008, 2007) and to poor mental mod-
els during reading (Smallwood et al. 2008). To-
gether these results suggest that while maintain-
ing streams of stimulus-independent thought in-
terfere  with the  integrity  of  external  attention,
the absence of awareness of mind-wandering is es-
pecially damaging to task performance.
Neurocognitive measures also reveal differ-
ences in the degree of activation between mind-
wandering episodes that have been classified as
aware versus unaware. In the combined experi-
ence sampling/fMRI study conducted by  Chris-
toff et al. (2009), mind-wandering with awareness
activated similar brain regions to those observed
during mind-wandering without awareness. These
brain regions, however, were more strongly activ-
ated  when  mind-wandering  occurred  without
awareness (see Figure 11). The anterior prefrontal
cortex (BA10) was one of the brain regions signi-
ficantly more strongly recruited during unaware
episodes  of  mind-wandering.  Notably,  anterior
prefrontal cortex (PFC) recruitment has been dir-
ectly  linked  to  engagement  of  cognitive  meta-
awareness (McCaig et al. 2011). The observation
that this same brain region became specifically
more recruited during unaware episodes of mind-
wandering may seem surprising at first. However,
the anterior PFC may be involved in mind-wan-
dering  through  its  role  in  the  maintenance  of
thought. As discussed further below, its recruit-
ment during mind-wandering in the absence of
awareness may make it more difficult for meta-
awareness to be implemented. 
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Figure  11:  Mind-wandering in the (a) absence and (b)
presence of meta-awareness. (a) Regions of activation as-
sociated with mind-wandering in the absence of awareness
(off-task  unaware  versus  on-task):  (A)  Dorsal  ACC
(BA32); (B) Ventral ACC (BA32); (C) Precuneus (BA7);
(D) Posterior Temporoparietal Cortex (BA39); (E) Dorsal
Rostromedial  Prefrontal  Cortex  (BA10);  (F)  Right
Rostrolateral Prefrontal Cortex (BA10); (G) Posterior &
Anterior Insula; (H) Bilateral Temporopolar Cortex; (b)
Similar  regions  were  activated  during  mind-wandering
with  awareness  (off-task  aware  versus  on-task  compar-
ison) but to a lesser degree, including: (A) Dorsal ACC
(BA32);  (B) Ventral  ACC (BA24/32);  (G) Posterior &
Anterior  Insula.  Height  threshold  P<0.005,  extent
threshold k>5 voxels (from Christoff et al. 2009).
www.open-mind.net
3.3.3 Summary
In  sum,  the  investigation  of  mind-wandering
from  the  vantage  of  the  distinction  between
having  an  experience  (experiential  conscious-
ness) and explicitly realizing that one is having
an experience (meta-awareness) has provided a
fertile ground for developing a third-person un-
derstanding of first-person experience. This re-
search has begun to chart the stream of con-
sciousness, demonstrating that individuals regu-
larly vacillate between the outer realm of per-
ception  and  the  inner  realm of  thoughts  and
feelings. This fluctuation routinely evades expli-
cit meta-awareness, enabling people’s minds to
move on to a new topic without explicitly real-
izing this fact. Nevertheless, when directly quer-
ied,  people  are  remarkably  capable  of  intro-
specting and noticing whether or not they were
mind-wandering. The fluctuation of perspectives
on the mind that this approach affords raises
numerous questions. Here, I address three: 1) If
people  are  so  competent  at  recognizing  that
they  are  mind-wandering  when  queried,  then
why do they find it so difficult to notice this
fact on their own? 2) Are there ways of enhan-
cing the capacity to catch one’s mind in flight?
3) What are the implications of this approach
for the more general enterprise of the science of
first-person perspective? I consider these ques-
tions in turn.
3.3.3.1 Why is mind-wandering so easy 
to report but so difficult to catch?
The observation that meta-awareness is  so ef-
fective  at  discerning  mind-wandering  when
queried about it, yet so poor at catching it on
its own, raises the natural question of why this
discrepancy exists. Two potentially interrelated
explanations may contribute to this striking dis-
crepancy.
Like mind-wandering, meta-awareness ap-
pears to be associated with rhythms of atten-
tional flux (Schooler et al. 2011). Sometimes we
are explicitly aware of  our mental states,  and
other  times  we  are  not.  Such  vacillations  in
meta-awareness could readily contribute to indi-
viduals’ frequent tendency to overlook episodes
of  mind-wandering,  as  this  mental  state  may
only be notable when the explicit spotlight of
attention is metaphorically turned on itself. In-
deed the tendency to only notice mind-wander-
ing after the fact may similarly apply to other
mental states that routinely curtail the occur-
rence of meta-awareness. Like mind-wandering,
other subjective states such as sleep, anesthesia,
dreaming, and flow states are typically not no-
ticed while they are occurring, but are readily
acknowledged after the fact. Sleep (in the ab-
sence of dreaming) and anesthesia are typically
lacking  conscious  experience  entirely  and  so
clearly are not candidates for meta-awareness.
The  mental  states  associated  with  gradually
drifting off to sleep and dreaming do have phe-
nomenal content but typically lack meta-aware-
ness. This is why people routinely don’t notice
that they are falling asleep (a grave danger for
driving) or dreaming (except in the case of lucid
dreaming,  LaBerge 1980).  Another example is
that of flow states (Csikszentmihalyi 1988), dur-
ing which people engage in highly demanding
tasks at close to their optimum level of perform-
ance. In such cases, people lack the additional
resources  to  take  stock  of  their  experience,
which  may be  why meta-awareness  of  a  flow
state often leads to its sadly premature termina-
tion. Nevertheless, as in the other cases, after a
flow state has ended, individuals are quite able
to acknowledge its  occurrence.  In all  of  these
cases,  the  common denominator  may be  that
these various states (for one reason or another)
curtail  the  occurrence  of  meta-awareness,  and
thus are only noticed after the fact once the op-
portunity for meta-awareness reoccurs.
One reason why mind-wandering may un-
dermine meta-awareness may stem from its reli-
ance on the very same brain regions that may
be necessary for noticing its occurrence. A strik-
ing aspect of the brain regions associated with
mind-wandering  is  that  they  involve  many of
the systems that might be expected to contrib-
ute to the monitoring of the state. For example,
elements of the medial prefrontal cortex are re-
cruited  both  during  mind-wandering  and  in
tasks that require theory of mind (Gallagher &
Frith 2003).  As  mental  state  attribution  in-
volves  the  application  of  meta-cognitive  pro-
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cesses to information of a stimulus-independent
nature (e.g., inferences about the mental state
of another individual), the engagement of these
brain regions during mind-wandering could pro-
hibit their utility in the service of catching the
wandering  mind.  Similarly,  in  the  combined
fMRI/experience sampling study conducted by
Christoff et al. (2009), periods of mind-wander-
ing engaged regions such as the dorsal ACC, in-
volved in error-detection and conflict monitor-
ing, and the anterior PFC, involved in cognitive
meta-awareness.  If  mind-wandering  engages
both  meta-cognition  and  error-detection  sys-
tems  in  the  service  of  generating  a  coherent
stream  of  stimulus-independent  thought,  the
fact  that  these  systems  are  already  engaged
may  make  them  less  capable  of  detecting  a
mind-wandering episode. The observation that
mind-wandering  and  meta-cognitive  processes
both engage the same systems does not neces-
sarily  establish  a  causal  relationship  between
these two. Nevertheless, it remains an intriguing
speculation that our persistent failure to catch
ourselves  mind-wandering  may  occur  because
mind-wandering hijacks the precise meta-cognit-
ive brain regions that are necessary for noticing
it. Future research might profitably explore this
hypothesis by examining whether mind-wander-
ing episodes that are experimentally induced to
emphasize meta-cognitive reflection are particu-
larly likely to evade detection.
3.3.3.2 Are there ways of enhancing 
people’s awareness of their 
mind-wandering?
One of the clear findings of research on mind-
wandering is that it can be extremely disrupt-
ive to performance. Reading (Smallwood et al.
2008),  working  memory  (McVay &  Kane
2009), vigilance (Cheyne et al. 2009), and gen-
eral  intellectual  functioning  (Mrazek et  al.
2012) can be seriously disrupted by mind-wan-
dering,  especially  when  it  occurs  without
awareness (Smallwood et al. 2008). This raises
the  natural  question  of  whether  enhancing
people’s  meta-awareness  of  their  minds  can
help to curtail the disruptive consequences of
mind-wandering.
Of course, just because episodes of mind-
wandering  routinely  end  with  a  moment  of
meta-awareness  (“shoot,  I  drifted  off  again”)
does not mean that the meta-awareness neces-
sarily was responsible for its ending (Schooler et
al. 2011).  Meta-awareness  could  be  a  con-
sequence rather than the source of the termina-
tion of a mind-wandering episode. According to
this view, the intuition that meta-awareness ter-
minates mind-wandering episodes is another ex-
ample of an over-reach of the attribution of de-
liberate intention (Metzinger 2013). While this
remains a viable possibility, it is also the case
that mindfulness techniques aimed at enhancing
awareness of one’s internal states can curtail the
negative effects of mind-wandering.
In one study (Mrazek et al. 2013), parti-
cipants were randomly assigned to one of two
interventions that they were told were expected
to  enhance  their  performance:  two  weeks  of
training either in mindfulness meditation, or in
good nutrition practices. Both interventions in-
volved similar time commitments, expectations,
and homework (either daily mediation or a nu-
trition journal). Before and after the interven-
tion, participants were given both reading com-
prehension  and  working  memory  tasks,  and
their mind-wandering during each was assessed.
Compared to the nutrition control, the mindful-
ness  intervention  significantly  reduced  mind-
wandering,  improved  performance  on  both
tasks, and these benefits were mediated by the
reduction in mind-wandering for those who were
high in  mind-wandering  to begin with.  These
findings dovetail with other recent studies indic-
ating that the general tendency for mindfulness
(being present in the moment) is negatively cor-
related  with  mind-wandering  (Mrazek et  al.
2012), and that even a simple mindfulness exer-
cise conducted with non-meditators (focusing on
one’s breath for eight minutes) can temporarily
reduce mind-wandering (Mrazek et al. 2012). 
Although research on the impact of mind-
fulness training in dampening mind-wandering
is consistent with the notion that part of its ef-
ficacy  is  due  to  enhancing  meta-awareness,
there is  one finding that  does not  completely
square with this account. Specifically, Mrazek et
al. (2012) found that mindfulness  training re-
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duced people’s  tendency to spontaneously  no-
tice mind-wandering episodes. However, this re-
duction  in  self-caught  mind-wandering  could
have occurred because the mindfulness practice
enhanced  people’s  awareness  of  the  focus  of
their  attention,  thereby preventing them from
initiating mind-wandering episodes in the first
place. Consistent with this speculation, another
recent  study  (Baird et  al. in  press)  demon-
strated that a similar mindfulness program can
enhance  at  least  one  meta-cognitive  skill,
namely,  the  ability  to  assess  the  accuracy  of
memory recognition judgments. Although more
research  is  clearly  needed,  it  remains  quite
plausible that one mechanism by which mind-
fulness  training reduces  mind-wandering  is  by
increasing  people’s  meta-awareness  of  when
their minds are beginning to wander.
3.3.3.3 What are the implications of this 
approach for the more general 
enterprise of the science of first-
person perspective? 
The program of research outlined above demon-
strates the insights into first person experience
that can be gleaned by assessing it from a third-
person perspective.  In many respects,  the ap-
proach described here exemplifies the program
of  heterophenomenology  that  Dennett  advoc-
ates.  We  are  systematically  assessing  people’s
reports about their conscious experiences while
explicitly acknowledging that those reports cor-
respond to people’s beliefs about their experi-
ence (i.e., their meta-awareness) and not neces-
sarily their actual experience. However, by using
various reasonable markers of people’s internal
states we have been able to examine the condi-
tions under which people’s reports are more or
less likely to be aligned with their experience.
In this regard, we find that when people are ex-
plicitly asked whether they were just mind-wan-
dering, their self-reports align with a host of be-
havioral and physiological measures that should
co-vary  with  mind-wandering.  These  findings
suggest that people are quite accurate in retro-
spectively assessing whether  or  not  they were
just mind-wandering. In other words, by trian-
gulating between people’s retrospective self-re-
ports  of  mind-wandering  (following experience
sampling  cues)  and  both  behavioral  and
physiological measures, we have identified situ-
ations  in  which  all  evidence  suggests  that
people’s  opinions  about  the  content  of  their
private experience is generally quite accurate. 
At the same time, by introducing the self-
caught  procedure  in  combination  with  retro-
spective  assessments  of  people’s  awareness  of
prior  states  of  mind-wandering,  we  have  also
documented critical  lacunae in people’s know-
ledge of their mental states. Specifically we find
that people routinely fail to spontaneously no-
tice  when  their  minds  have  wandered.  When
tasked with reporting mind-wandering whenever
they  become  aware  of  it,  people  routinely
demonstrate  behavior  indicative  of  mind-wan-
dering  while  failing  to  report  it.  If  they  are
probed during periods in which these measures
suggest they are mind-wandering, they routinely
indicate that they now realize that they were
mind-wandering, but they had not noticed this
state until the time of the probe. We are thus
also able to identify situations in which all evid-
ence  suggests  people  are  routinely  lacking  in
their current knowledge of their ongoing mental
state.
By  triangulating  between  people’s  first-
person reports and multiple other third-person
measures we have begun to reveal the relation-
ship between people’s beliefs about their experi-
ence and empirical indices  of  their  underlying
mental states (for related approaches, see Hurl-
burt &  Heavey 2001;  Jack &  Roepstorff 2002;
Lambie &  Marcel 2002;  Lutz &  Thompson
2003). Moreover, the theory of the intermittent
and imperfect nature of meta-awareness as a re-
representation  of  experience  (Schooler &
Schreiber 2004;  Schooler 2002;  Schooler et  al.
2015) provides a scaffold for conceptualizing the
situations in  which beliefs  and underlying ex-
perience converge and diverge. Of course,  one
could  always  counter  that  we cannot  be  sure
that the variety of behavioral and physiological
measures that correlate with self-reported men-
tal states such as mind-wandering are necessar-
ily indicative of those states. Perhaps there is
some third variable that is responsible for both
mind-wandering and the host of measures that
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we find to be correlated with people’s self-re-
porting of it. But it seems a stretch to suggest
that this entirely unknown third variable could
account  for  why,  when  people  say  they  were
mind-wandering, their performance on primary
tasks is impaired, their eye movements become
less sensitive to what they are looking at, their
physiological measures indicate a dampening of
attention to external processes, and their brain
activation  corresponds  to  that  which  occurs
when they are unoccupied.  In short,  a strong
case can be made for the value of using empir-
ical third-person science to inform not only our
understanding of people’s beliefs about their ex-
perience, but also to discern when those beliefs
are likely to be accurate and when they may be
inaccurate or incomplete. 
It seems likely that those with strong alle-
giances to either an exclusively first- or third-
person  account of  experience will  balk  at  the
notion that  third-person empirical  indices  can
be used to corroborate people’s first-person ac-
counts.  Traditional  phenomenologists  (e.g.,
Husserl 1963) may contend that first-person ex-
perience is privileged and so, when discrepancies
arise between it and third-person data, that the
former should invariably be favored. Those with
a  behaviorist  bent  may  argue  that  making
claims  about  underlying  subjective  states  re-
mains a dead end because ultimately they can
never truly be verified. Personally I find myself
sympathetic to both of the vantages; however, I
argue that the striking disparity of these views,
both  from each other  and from the  one  pro-
moted here, stems from the incongruence that
naturally arises from shifting perspectives.
From the vantage of one perspective of a
Necker cube, the alternative perspective makes
little sense. When the spinning dancer is mov-
ing in one direction, it is hard to imagine how
she could possibly shift directions.  Those who
have never entered the third dimension of a Ma-
gic Eye image could reasonably doubt that such
a perspective could possibly exist. But once one
realizes that there are distinctly different per-
spectives  to  be  had  on a  situation,  and  that
these  alternative  perspectives  each  offer  their
own valuable vantage, then that knowledge can
be held even as one remains incapable of experi-
encing both at the same time. I believe this is
the case with interpreting scientific third-person
accounts  of  first-person  experience.  If  one  is
capable of recognizing both the strengths and
limitations of  each perspective,  then they can
use each to inform the other. If, however, they
solely look at a problem from one or the other
perspective,  then this  may lead to a logically
consistent view, but one that omits an import-
ant vantage. I turn now to a consideration of
this  larger  issue:  namely,  conceptualizing  a
meta-perspective that can accommodate the va-
cillating  manner  in  which  first-person  experi-
ence is both that which we know best and un-
derstand least.
4 Toward a meta-perspective for 
considering the metaphysics of first- 
versus third-person perspective
It is my contention that debates about how to
reconcile the first- and third-person perspective
on reality arise in part from the distinct vant-
ages that different scholars  take on the issue.
The problem in a nutshell is that while the pre-
vailing third-person perspective of science (ma-
terial  reductionism) does  an  admirable  job  of
accounting for all aspects of reality that are re-
vealed from its vantage, it robustly fails to ac-
commodate several self-evident aspects of exist-
ence that  are  uniquely  apparent  from a first-
person  perspective.  If  one  simply  dismisses
those  aspects  of  the  first-person  perspective
that are incongruent with the third-person per-
spective,  (as  most  scientists  and  many  philo-
sophers do), then there is no problem. However,
here I will argue that there exist self-evident ob-
servations  derived  from  the  first-person  per-
spective that are as compelling as any objective
fact.  Such  observations  should  not  be  simply
dismissed  as  irrelevant  or  illusory  but  rather
suggest the need of serious revision to current
accounts  of  physical  reality  (for  related  argu-
ments see  Chalmers 2002;  Nagel 2012). In the
following section, I first review the material re-
ductionist  account suggested by the prevailing
third-person  perspective  view.  I  then consider
several elements of existence revealed by a first-
person perspective that seem to have no place
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in this account, most notably subjective experi-
ence, the flow of time, and the distinctiveness of
the present. Finally, I offer some speculative re-
marks about the nature of a meta-perspective
that might be able to accommodate both vant-
ages.
4.1 Ontological third-person 
perspective—Material reductionism
When reality is  conceived of strictly from the
vantage of a third-person perspective,  it quite
naturally leads to the premise of material reduc-
tionism, namely that everything including the
arising of subjective experience can be accom-
modated on the basis of physical principles that
do  not  themselves  make  any  appeal  to  con-
sciousness. This account is arguably the prevail-
ing  view  among  both  scientists  (e.g.,  Crick
1994;  Bloom 2009;  Graziano 2013)  and philo-
sophers (e.g.,  Dennett 1993;  Churchland 1989;
Metzinger 2004). Its strength comes from its re-
markable record of success. Having abandoned
the superstitions and spiritual whimsies of the
past, hard-nosed science has an amazing track
record for explaining everything it has been dir-
ected  toward  with  purely  physical  constructs.
Aspects of reality that were once thought to be
beyond the ken of the third-person perspective
of science, for example the notion of some sort
of mystical force of life, élan vital, have been re-
duced to rigorous formalisms (e.g., DNA code).
Admittedly, we do not currently have a full ac-
counting of how it is that we experience a first-
person perspective on reality, but given science’s
track record, it is presumed to be merely a mat-
ter  of  time  before  these  experiences  are  ex-
plained with precisely the same type of accounts
that have been used so successfully to explain
so much so far (Churchland 1989). People may
feel as if they have some type of privileged per-
spective, as if the view from within their own
minds could never be reduced to and explained
by the machinations of atoms, but this is just
shortsightedness, perhaps fueled by some evolu-
tionary advantage to view mind and matter as
different (Bloom 2009). 
There is much to be said for material re-
ductionism, as it draws on the very assumptions
that have led to the remarkable progress of sci-
ence. To appeal to the existence of some other
distinct realm of reality beyond the objectively
physical smacks of ghosts and fairy dust (e.g.,
Jackson 1982). To date, while the previous ana-
lysis has revealed the marked advances to our
understanding  that  emerge  when  we  consider
people’s  first-person  perspectives,  no  explana-
tion in science has required abandoning an ex-
clusive reliance on mutually verifiable third-per-
son observations. In other words, although I will
soon suggest cases that may challenge this tra-
dition,  to  date  there  are  no  third-person  ac-
counts of  physical  phenomena that  have been
undermined  solely  because  they  conflict  with
first-person experience. Given the track record
of third-person accounts, it may seem hard to
justify why one scientific question (the arising
of conscious experience) should challenge an on-
tological perspective that is not problematic for
anything else. 
4.2 Ontological first-person perspective—
What material reductionism leaves out
Although  material  reductionism  provides  an
outstanding  vantage  for  accounting  for  the
physical world, it comes up wanting when the
mind is inspected from a first-person perspect-
ive. The essential challenge is that even if a ma-
terialistic explanation is able to account for how
the mind functions, this does not explain how it
is that there is a subjective experience associ-
ated with it, or why that experience is as it is.
As Jackson (1982) puts it:
Tell  me  everything  physical  there  is  to
tell  about what  is  going  on  in  a  living
brain, the kind of states, their functional
role,  their  relation  to  what  goes  on  at
other times and in other brains, and so
on and so forth, and be I as clever as can
be  in  fitting  it  all  together,  you  won’t
have  told  me  about  the  hurtfulness  of
pains,  the  itchiness  of  itches,  pangs  of
jealousy, or about the characteristic ex-
perience  of  tasting  a  lemon,  smelling  a
rose,  hearing a loud noise or seeing the
sky. (p. 127)
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Jackson  introduces  the  canonical  example  of
Mary the color scientist to illustrate this point.
Imagine that Mary is a color scientist who has
been brought up in a black and white room and
has  never  experienced  red;  nevertheless,  she
knows all there is to know about the physical pro-
cesses relevant to color vision. Jackson’s point is
that if she later experiences red firsthand, she will
learn a new fact (the experience of red) that all of
her  physical  knowledge  was  insufficient  to
provide.  Complete  physical  knowledge  about  a
subjective  experience  is  insufficient  to  entirely
know all there is to know about that experience.
One has to actually have the first-person experi-
ence to fully understand it.
A second criticism of material reduction-
ism involves its inability to explain the arising
of conscious experience. It is quite straightfor-
ward to imagine how physical processes could
account for  the structure  and function of  the
mind in much the same way that they can ex-
plain the structure of computer hardware and
the functions of computer software. But such an
account would not explain how subjectivity it-
self arises or what it is like from the vantage of
the experiencer.  Similarly,  even  if  we were  to
create  a  computer  that  perfectly  emulated  a
conscious being, we could not know whether it
was genuinely conscious, and if it were, “what it
is like to be” (Nagel 1974) a computer. 
The inherent difficulty of conceptualizing
how  material  objects  enjoy  subjective  experi-
ence is further illustrated by a third criticism of
material reductionism, namely that it is possible
to conceive of a system that has all of the phys-
ical  characteristics  of  a  conscious  being,  but
nevertheless  lacks  consciousness.  Philosophical
zombies  (Chalmers 1995) are hypothetical  hu-
man beings who have no internal experience but
are otherwise identical to normal people in all
other physical measurements and behaviors (in-
cluding claiming that they are conscious).  Al-
though there is no way of demonstrating that
such creatures could ever exist, there is also no
way of demonstrating that they couldn’t. Find-
ing the neural correlates of consciousness helps
not an iota, as even a zombie who reported con-
sciousness in certain brain states would still not
be  actually  enjoying  a  genuine  experiential
state.  If  zombies  that  are  physically  indistin-
guishable  from  experiencing  humans  could  in
principle exist, then there is nothing inherent in
what  is  known  about  physical  systems  that
speaks  to  the  arising  of  consciousness.  This
presents a major problem to the prevailing ma-
terial reductionist view because it offers no way
to  distinguish  between  philosophical  zombies
and the non-zombies. 
The  essential  problem  of  the  exclusively
third-person perspective of material reduction-
ism is that it is forced to ignore all aspects of
experience that cannot be reduced to a third-
person perspective. A thought experiment may
help  to  provide  a  further  “intuition  pump”
(Dennett 2014) for illustrating just how special
that  extra  something  might  be.  Consider  the
following science fiction variant on the classic
Faustian  bargain  (Goethe 1867).  One  day,  to
your amazement, a flying saucer lands in front
of  you  and  a  member  of  a  clearly  more  ad-
vanced  species  emerges  and  says  that  he/she
(it’s  unclear)  has  been  enjoying  our  debates
about  the  mind-body  problem,  which  his/her
civilization has solved. If philosophical zombies
are logically3 possible, you can be turned into
one. He/she offers you all the gold you can ima-
gine (they’ve also mastered alchemy) if you are
willing to accept the risk of becoming a zombie.
If a zombie is a logical possibility, you will be
transformed into one. From everyone else’s per-
spective (i.e., the third-person perspective), you
will be exactly as you were before (just much
richer). However, you will not actually have any
experience at all; you will simply seem to others
as  if  you  do.  Would  you  take  the  bargain?
Hard-nosed  material  reductionists  say  they
would  (D.  Dennett,  personal  communication,
7/15/2014;  M.  Graziano,  6/10/2014,  personal
communication),  but  many  of  the  rest  of  us
might not. What is the value of untold wealth,
if there is no inner experience by which it can
be enjoyed?
The  Zombie Faustian Bargain serves as a
useful  intuition  pump  for  illustrating  the  im-
3 Let’s  just  assume,  for  the sake of  argument,  that  the  aliens  had
solved the tricky issue of moving from logical to nomological possibil-
ity, that is that if it is possible for a philosophical zombie to exist in
any conceivable universe, that it would be possible for you to become
one.
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portance of the extra something that is left out
of  the  third-person  material  reductionist  per-
spective.  Nevertheless,  it  is  clearly  a  fanciful
proposition  and  material  reductionists  might
reasonably  argue  that  there  is  not  much  to
worry about if the only cost to adopting their
view is not knowing how to respond to such an
unlikely scenario. However, there are numerous
other examples closer to home where the limits
of  a  third-person  accounting  of  consciousness
become relevant. Issues surrounding the nature
and existence of consciousness in other species,
fetuses, and computers all revolve around infer-
ences  about  first-person  experiences  that
gravely exceed all known or conceived ways of
reconciliation. 
A less obvious domain for a clash between
the current prevailing third-person perspective
of science and first-person experiences arises in,
of all places, physics. Although there has been
some  speculation,  now  largely  disregarded  by
the mainstream, that consciousness could have
something to do with the collapse of the wave
function in quantum physics  (Wigner &  Mar-
genau 1967),  in  general,  consciousness  is  as-
sumed to have little relevance to physics. How-
ever, there are two current assumptions in phys-
ics that seem to squarely contradict first-person
experience.  Specifically,  physicists  believe  that
the flow of time is an illusion and that there is
nothing special about the present. Before con-
sidering why these claims are so problematic for
the  existence  of  subjective  experience,  let  us
first consider why physics makes this claim.
4.3 Why physicists dismiss the flow of 
time and the privileged present
In considering the nature of time, physicists of-
ten “spatialize” it. In other words, they attempt
to place it on a similar footing to the traditional
three  dimensions  of  space  (see  Figure  10).
Though differing from spatial dimensions in im-
portant respects (Einstein 2001), the notion of
time as similar to a spatial dimension is a key
feature of the prevailing Einstein/Minkowski in-
terpretation of  special  relativity  theory.  Space
and time are combined in this theory into one
concept: space-time. The spatialization of time
allows  the  depiction  of  a  “block  universe”  in
which the traditional spatial dimensions are re-
duced (for purposes of visual illustration) to two
dimensions from three, and time is added as a
third  dimension.  Such  a  depiction  can  be
thought  of  as  a  space-time  “loaf  of  bread,”
where  each  narrow  cross-  section  of  the  loaf
(“slice”)  constitutes  a  moment in  time of  the
entire universe. According to the block universe
view  (widely  held  by  today’s  physicists),  all
slices—past, present, and future—already exist.
This arises from the relativity of simultaneity,
which means that “now” is different for differ-
ent observers. It is simply that each individual
observer is privy to only one moment (slice) at
a time. From the vantage of a block universe,
the only thing that seems to actually move in
time is consciousness itself (i.e., the observer).
This means that from the vantage of the pre-
vailing view of physics, the flow of time is not a
part of objective reality but simply an artifact
of subjective experience. As Stanford physicist
Linde (2004) notes: “Thus we see that without
introducing an observer,  we have a dead uni-
verse  that  does  not  evolve  in  time”  (p.  25).
What is more, once we conceive of the temporal
dimension as the equivalent of another spatial
dimension, then there are not enough degrees of
freedom for the observer to move in time; that
is, movement requires a rate in time, but time
in the block universe is already represented as a
spatial dimension, and thus cannot also be used
as the metric that establishes the rate of move-
ment through time. As the physicist Paul Dav-
ies (2002) puts it:
Nothing other  than a  conscious  observer
registers the flow of time. A clock meas-
ures durations between events much as a
measuring tape measures distance between
places;  it  does  not  measure  the  ‘speed’
with which one moment succeeds another.
Therefore it appears that the flow is sub-
jective, not objective. (p. 36)
The upshot of this reasoning is that the flow of
time is an illusion, an artifact of consciousness.
Again, as Davies (2002) puts it: “From the fixed
past to the tangible present to the undecided
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future, it feels as though time flows inexorably
on. But that is an illusion” (p. 32). 
Figure 12: Although the conventional view derived from
experience is that the present is real and moves through
time, current views in physics say this is erroneous. Ac-
cording to the standard block universe view in physics, all
moments—past,  present,  and  future—are  equally  real.
The flow of time and the privileged present are seen as il-
lusions of consciousness (from Davies 2002).
The characterization of reality as a block
universe, with the flow of time as an illusion of
consciousness, also leads to the conclusion that
the privileged present is an illusion. One of the
most pronounced aspects of consciousness is its
extension  in  time.  Consciousness  extends  in
time and thereby gains the “now” in which it
resides.  First-person  observers  may  remember
the past or imagine the future (as often hap-
pens  during  mind-wandering)  but  ultimately
mental  time  travel  always  takes  place  in  the
present.  The observer  perpetually  and exclus-
ively  resides  in  the  present.  In  this  sense,  it
seems intuitively self-evident that the “now” is
privileged. But not so from the current vantage
of  the  block  universe  in  physics,  where  the
present is treated exactly the same as the past
and the  future.  As  Einstein  himself  observed,
“The past, present and future are only illusions,
even if stubborn ones” (quoted in  Hoffmann &
Dukas 1972, p. 258). Again, the problem is that
the only thing that defines the present from the
vantage of a block universe is that it is where
the observer perceives itself to be at any partic-
ular moment in time. But from the vantage of a
block universe, all moments of time exist simul-
taneously.
The notions that the flow of time and the
privileged  present  are  merely  illusions  of  con-
sciousness are less problematic from a third-per-
son perspective than the first-person perspect-
ive. If there is no ultimate reality to subjectiv-
ity, then there is no problem making claims that
are directly in opposition to subjective experi-
ence.  At  a  recent  public  lecture,  I  asked  the
noted physicist Brian Greene how he reconciled
physics’ static view of nature with the self-evid-
ently dynamic experience of consciousness. His
reply  was  that  he  “sees  a  psychiatrist,”  that
consciousness is capable of all sorts of illusions,
and that the flow of  time is just another ex-
ample of the artifacts of consciousness. 
While as detailed in the earlier section of
this paper, I am the first to concede that our
first-person reports can be fallible, as conscious-
ness is capable of all sorts of illusions, it is hard
for me to conceive of how consciousness could
create  an illusion  of  the  flow of  time,  or  the
privileged  present.  There  are  several  reasons
why I am skeptical of this claim. First, just as
matter must have extension in space in order to
exist, so too it seems that consciousness must
have extension in time. If consciousness had no
“thickness” in time, then I simply do not under-
stand how it could exist any more than an ob-
ject  could  exist  without  some  extension  in
space.  Time  is  the  dimension  in  which  con-
sciousness extends. Although the objective dur-
ation of the specious present (James 1918) may
be rather modest (Pöppel 1997) without at least
some extension in time I do not see how there
can be any consciousness at all. Second, my ex-
perience is defined in terms of the flow of time
and a privileged present; the stream of my con-
sciousness is essentially a succession of “nows,”
with  the  present  always  entailing  the  bridge
between the past now and the future now. In a
nutshell, from my first-person perspective I find
the reality of the flow of time and the privileged
present as compelling as the existence of phys-
ical reality itself (which also could in principle
be an illusion, Descartes 1641/1996). 
4.4 Reconciling first- and third-person 
perspectives of reality
Those who subscribe to a strict material reduc-
tionist perspective insist that when first-person
experience  suggests  characteristics  of  reality
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that are not readily handled by a third-person
account,  that  those  aspects  must  be rejected.
From a strict materialist perspective, the seem-
ingly privileged knowledge afforded by subject-
ive experience, the flow of time, and the unique
significance of the present all  must be disreg-
arded as illusions of consciousness. But herein
lies  the  rub.  The  third-person  perspective  on
reality is adequate as long as it provides con-
structs that correspond to the core aspects of
the  first-person  perspective.  However,  when
that perspective requires me to abandon abso-
lutely  fundamental  aspects  of  my  experience,
then I am forced to question the assumptions
that impose that requirement. 
Whether we acknowledge it or not, all of us
must discern for ourselves what aspects of exist-
ence to take as axiomatic. By definition, axioms
cannot  be  empirically  proven  or  logically  de-
duced,  rather  they are self-evident truths that
must be taken as givens. Perhaps the most fun-
damental of all such axioms is that physical real-
ity exists; i.e., that I am not residing in a sol-
ipsistic mirage. Ultimately, while I grant the on-
tological reality of the physical world, in an im-
portant sense I am less epistemologically certain
of it than I am of partaking in subjective experi-
ence. Ultimately, the only thing that I can know
with absolute confidence is that I am currently
enjoying  a  first-person  experience  (Descartes
1996). Physical reality could be a dream, I could
be a brain in a vat or the matrix, indeed even
my past could be an illusion, but there is simply
no question but that I am currently having an
experience. It might be an illusory experience4,
but  even  an illusory experience  is  still  experi-
enced.  Thus,  although  it  is  conceivable  that
physical reality could be an illusion, it is incon-
ceivable (at least to me) that the occurrence of
my subjective experience could be entirely base-
less. This leads me to conclude that the existence
of subjective experience and all premises that ne-
cessarily underpin its existence must be treated
on equal ontological grounds to that of physical
reality. Accordingly, if we grant subjective exper-
ience an ontological status equivalent to that of
4 An illusory experience being defined as an experience that does not correspond
to actual reality, such as a hallucination. Note that a philosophical zombie does
not have an illusory experience of being conscious, it has no experience at all. 
objective reality then we must seriously question
any  characterization  of  objective  reality  that
challenges  the  essential  qualities  of  subjective
reality. While much of our subjective experience
may be an illusion, it is very difficult to see how
the privileged vantage of subjective experience,
the  flow of  time,  or  the  unique  status  of  the
present could be such. To quote the philosopher
David Ray Griffin (2007): “The reality of time is
a more fundamental and stubborn fact than the
alleged facts  on which its denial is  based” (p.
119). 
A variety of approaches has been offered
to  accommodate  the  seeming limitations  of  a
purely  physical  accounting  of  consciousness.
Idealism (Berkeley 1878;  Goswami 1993;  Hoff-
man 2008) responds to the seemingly superior
ontological status of subjective experience (i.e.,
its existence is more certain than an inferred ex-
ternal reality) by suggesting that if one must be
reduced to the other, then it should be physical
reality that is seen to be an outgrowth of sub-
jectivity, rather than the other way round (as
the  material  reductionists  contend).  Although
difficult  to  refute,  idealism  (at  least  in  the
macro sense of conscious beings creating reality
with consciousness) appears to discount the in-
dependent  existence  of  a  natural  world,  and
thus seems at odds with a scientific vantage. 
Another  approach  for  reconciling  the
seemingly incommensurate existence of the sub-
jective and objective is to pose that they both
exist as two interacting yet distinct realms. This
approach  (substance  dualism)  was  favored  by
Descartes, but it has a serious logical deficiency
(at least as originally formulated): if two realms
are  truly  incommensurate  and  distinct,  then
there seems to be no way for them to interact.
To posit a “ghost in the machine” (Ryle 2009)
is to assume that the ghost can affect the ma-
chine, which means that they share some com-
mon ground and therefore are not entirely dis-
tinct realms. This difficulty has proven a major
problem  for  substance  dualism  (Armstrong
1999), although see  Chalmers (2002) for argu-
ments as to why the challenge of understanding
the causal nexus between the mental and phys-
ical is not unlike similar issues of causality ob-
served within the physical realm. 
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In my view, the seeming impasse between
the third- and first-person perspectives of reality
strongly  suggests  the  existence  of  some  other
meta-perspective  that  can  accommodate  them
both. Like the reversible images that can initially
invoke  one  of  two  entirely  opposed  interpreta-
tions,  but  that  can  subsequently  be  reconciled
from a vantage that recognizes the reality of both,
(even if they cannot be both apprehended simul-
taneously) so too it seems there must be some
meta-perspective for reconciling first- and third-
person  vantages  on  reality.  In  other  words,  it
seems likely that there exists a higher order out-
look that simultaneously acknowledges the man-
ner in which neither perspective can simply be re-
duced to the other, yet still offers a mode of resol-
ution. It is clearly easier to recognize the need for
a meta-perspective than to identify precisely what
such a view might be. Nevertheless, it seems a
goal well worth pursuing.
Over the years, a number of scholars have
tried their hand at envisioning a vantage that
neither  tries  to  reduce  the  subjective  to  the
physical, nor the physical to the subjective, but
rather  conceives  of  some  common  ground  or
property that may be reflective of both. This
approach, often referred to as neutral monism
(Chalmers 2002; Feigl 1958; James 1904; Russell
1927),  though with close affinities to dual as-
pect  theories  (e.g.,  Jackson 1982;  Nagel 1986;
Spinoza 1677/1985; Velmans 2009), attempts to
identify a neutral realm of existence that can be
alternately characterized as mental, physical, or
neither. 
The  ever-changing  present  represents  a
core  element  of  the  common  ground  between
subjectivity and objectivity that is  invoked in
several accountings of neutral monism. For Wil-
liam James, the neutral realm was the present: 
The instant field of the present is  at all
times what I call the ‘pure’ experience. It
is only virtually or potentially either ob-
ject or subject as yet. For the time being,
it is plain, unqualified actuality, or exist-
ence, a simple that. (1904, p. 23) 
For Bertrand Russell, the neutral realm was the
event: “Everything in the world is composed of
‘events.’… An ‘event,’  as  I  understand it  … is
something occupying a small  finite amount of
space-time.”  For  Alfred North Whitehead
(1929), the present also served as the nexus of
conjunction between the objective and the sub-
jective. In Whitehead’s panpsychic characteriza-
tion of reality, the interface between first- and
third-person perspectives occurs in the “creative
advance” of the present in which time marches
forward in a continual alternation among all ele-
ments of reality between subjective and object-
ive  states  (for  further  discussions  of  White-
head’s account, see Griffin 2007; Hunt 2011).
Information  represents  a  second  element
that  unites  several  efforts  to  find the  neutral
realm  from  which  both  subjectivity  and  ob-
jectivity arise. As Chalmers (1996) observes:
Perhaps,  then,  the  intrinsic  nature  re-
quired to ground the information states is
closely  related  to  the  intrinsic  nature
present in phenomenology. Perhaps one is
even constitutive of the other. That way,
we get away with a cheap and elegant on-
tology,  and solve  the  two problems in  a
single blow. (pp. 304–305) 
Sayre (1976) similarly argues that “the concept
of information provides a primitive for the ana-
lysis of both the physical and the mental.” The
notion that information somehow serves as the
interface between the subjective and the object-
ive  is  also  a  central  component  of  Tononi’s
(2008)  recent  suggestion  that  consciousness
arises when matter produces “integrated inform-
ation,” which is defined as “the amount of in-
formation generated by a complex of elements,
above and beyond the information generated by
its parts” (p. 216). The basic idea is that com-
plex  systems  that  integrate  information,  even
potentially non-nonbiological ones,  will  experi-
ence  some  minimal  amount  of  consciousness:
something it is like to be that system (see also
Koch 2012, 2013).
In  sum,  although  there  is  considerable
variability in the manner in which scholars have
conceptualized  the  common  ground  of  reality
from which both  the  objective  and subjective
emerge, two common elements are 1) that the
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interface  occurs  within  the  ongoing  march  of
the present, and 2) that it is constituted within
the shared informational properties entailed in
both  objective  and  subjective  states.  A  final
shared aspect  of  many of  these approaches is
that  subjectivity represents  a  fundamental  at-
tribute of the universe that either permeates all
aspects of matter (panpsychism), or exists as a
potentiality of  matter that emerges when cer-
tain  conditions  are  met  (protopanpsychism;
Chalmers 2002). Drawing on these general ob-
servations, I turn now to offering my own highly
speculative  conjectures  regarding  a  meta-per-
spective on reality that may provide the shared
foundation for first- and third-person perspect-
ives.
4.5 The possibility of a subjective 
dimension of reality 
Many scholars who posit that subjectivity is an
essential aspect of reality argue that ultimately
physics may need to be expanded to include con-
structs corresponding to subjective states. As the
philosopher David Chalmers (1995) observed:
I propose that conscious experience be con-
sidered a fundamental feature, irreducible to
anything more basic. … In the 19th century
it turned out that electromagnetic phenom-
ena could not be explained in terms of pre-
viously known principles. As a consequence,
scientists introduced electromagnetic charge
as a new fundamental entity and studied the
associated fundamental laws. Similar reason-
ing should be applied to consciousness.  If
existing  fundamental  theories  cannot  en-
compass it, then something new is required.
(p. 96)
Eminent physicist  Andrei Linde (1990) has also
speculated that consciousness may some day be
recognized as part of our understanding of phys-
ics:
Could it be that consciousness is an equally
important part of the consistent picture of
our world, despite the fact that so far one
could safely ignore it in the description of
the well-studied physical processes? Will it
not turn out, with the further development
of  science,  that the study of  the universe
and the study of consciousness are insepar-
ably linked, and that ultimate progress in
the one will be impossible without progress
in the other? (p. 27)
The critical question, of course, is: What in the
physical  universe  might  correspond  to  the
arising of consciousness?
To  recap,  the  physical  realm  as  currently
construed offers no place for subjective experience,
the flow of time, or the uniqueness of the present.
In order to bridge the gap between physical reality
and subjectivity, scholars have posited the exist-
ence of a neutral realm that gives rise to both.
Though  varied  in  their  emphasis,  two  elements
have emerged as likely components of this neutral
ground: the evolving present and information. To-
gether  these  considerations  suggest  that  a  con-
joined  first-person/third-person  meta-perspective
will likely conceptualize subjectivity, the present,
and the flow of time within an architecture that
closely links information to an ever-changing now.
Toward this end I offer the following conjecture:
consciousness  arises  via  the  changing  informa-
tional states associated with an observer’s move-
ment through objective time relative to a currently
unacknowledged dimension or dimensions of sub-
jective time.
Although speculative and highly underspe-
cified, the above account has intuitive appeal. The
sense of moving through time from one informa-
tional state to the next is clearly central to experi-
ence. Indeed it could well be said that it is the de-
fining aspect of our existence. It is difficult to con-
ceive of experience without invoking movement in
time  and  change  in  informational  state.  Recall
however that the current block universe portrayal
of time provides no way to conceptualize moving
through time, as movement in time would require
change in time at a rate that could never be spe-
cified. As the Physicist Paul Davies observes:
But what meaning can be attached to the
movement of time itself? Relative to what
does it move? Whereas other types of motion
relate one physical process to another, the
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putative flow of time relates time to itself.
Posing the simple question ‘How fast does
time pass?’ exposes the absurdity of the very
idea.  The  trivial  answer  ‘One  second  per
second’ tells us nothing at all. (2002, p. 8) 
Thus to move in time requires movement in rela-
tionship to some dimension other than time itself.
The postulation of an additional temporal dimen-
sion allows observers to change information states
in objective time relative to subjective time. In-
deed, it seems possible (and perhaps even a math-
ematical necessity) that in order to extend in and
move  through  space-time  (i.e.,  the  block  uni-
verse), there needs to be at least one additional
dimension to provide the degree of freedom neces-
sary to enable such movement (Schooler et  al.
2011). In other words, if we accept the block uni-
verse  model5 of  reality,  then in  order  to move
through objective time, we have to move relative
to something, and that something cannot itself be
time because all time exists simultaneously in the
block universe. A seemingly reasonable solution is
to posit an additional dimension (or dimensions)
of time. Although the postulation of additional
dimensions of reality should not be taken lightly,
it is not without precedent. In physics, string the-
ory  has  postulated  seven additional  spatial  di-
mensions beyond the three dimensions of space
and one dimension of time that are customarily
acknowledged (Greene 2004). If there can be mul-
tiple dimensions of space, then might there not
also  be  additional  dimensions  of  time?  Indeed,
some physicists have argued that an additional di-
mension of time might be very useful for concep-
tualizing  various  issues  in  physics  (Bars et  al.
1998). If the postulation of an additional dimen-
sion (or dimensions) of subjective time could also
resolve the paradox of time and provide a realm
for subjectivity, then surely that would also war-
rant its consideration as a possibility.
I am not the first to suggest that the failure
of objective time (as it is currently conceptual-
ized) to afford the flow of time or inner experi-
ence may require the postulation of an additional
5 Another possible way of reconciling the challenges of the flow of
time and the present is  to discard the notion of the block uni-
verse.  While  this  vantage  is  the  prevailing  view  in  physics
(Greene 2004), some have suggested that it needs revising (Hunt
2014; Smolin 2013).
subjective dimension (or dimensions) in which the
observer  moves  relative  to  physical  space-time
(e.g., Smythies 2003). Noting the inability of cur-
rent theories of physics to account for the flow of
time  or  the  existence  of  subjective  experience,
physicist Linde speculates that dimensions of con-
sciousness may be required to provide the neces-
sary degrees of freedom. Linde (2004) observes:
Is it possible that consciousness, like space-
time, has its own intrinsic degrees of free-
dom, and that neglecting these will lead to a
description  of  the  universe  that  is  funda-
mentally incomplete? What if  our percep-
tions are as  real  (or  maybe,  in  a certain
sense, are even more real) than material ob-
jects? What if my red, my blue, my pain,
are really existing objects, not merely reflec-
tions of the really existing material world?
Is it possible to introduce a ‘space of ele-
ments of consciousness’….? (p. 451)
I remain agnostic regarding precisely how many
additional dimensions may be required in order to
provide the degrees of freedom necessary for time
to flow and consciousness to have extensions in
the present. Indeed, I am not even committed to
the notion that such a realm must necessarily be
thought of as possessing all of the mathematical
formalities  of  spatial  dimensions.  My  point  is
simply  that  the  current  material  reductionist
model of reality has left no room for time to flow
or now to exist. It is as if physics has built a pen-
dulum clock but left no space for the pendulum
to swing. In statistics, there always must be one
more degree of freedom than the total number of
subjects and conditions so as to leave the freedom
for variables to vary. I believe that such degrees of
freedom are similarly required to enable experi-
ence to flow through time. 
A  dynamic  depiction  of  the  value  of
adding  a  second  temporal  dimension  is  illus-
trated in the following three examples depicting
a  simple  event  of  bottles  breaking.  The  first
(Figure 13; see video clip in its description) de-
picts the event as it would unfold from the first-
person perspective, a dramatic shattering of ini-
tially  intact  colored  bottles.  The  second  ex-
ample (Figure  14) transforms this event into a
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block universe depiction in which objective time
is spatialized, and each slice corresponds to a
separate moment of  the event. Notice that in
the  block  universe  representation  there  is  no
motion (and hence no video clip), and no singu-
lar  frame  (i.e.,  slice)  corresponds  to  “now.”
However, in the third example (Figure  15; see
video clip in its description), an additional tem-
poral dimension is introduced so that the ob-
server  can  move  through  the  block  universe.
Frame  by  frame  a  moving  “now”  marches
through the block universe. By adding a second
temporal dimension to the block universe, the
dynamical experience of events unfolding is once
again achieved.
A spatialized depiction of  the notion of
observers moving through subjective time rel-
ative to physical space and objective time is
presented  in  Figures  16–18.  As  previously,
noted,  in  the  standard  presentation  of  the
block universe the three dimensions of  space
are, for graphical depiction, reduced down two
dimensions  (Figure  16).  Here,  in  order  to
provide room to depict an additional dimen-
sion, physical space is further reduced to one
dimension (Figure  17). Within this character-
ization, it is possible to see how the introduc-
tion of an additional dimension of subjective
time (Figure 18) provides the necessary degree
of  freedom  to  enable  an  observer  to  move
through time, as they can now move through
physical time via a succession of moments in
subjective time. An interesting implication of this charac-
terization is that observers can vary in the gran-
ularity (i.e.,  extent)  of  their  moments.  Notice
how in Figure 17, the observer with the smaller
spatial  extent  also  occupies  smaller  successive
moments in time.6 Intriguingly, there is evidence
to  support  this  view:  recent  findings  suggest
that  smaller  vertebrates  may have  a  different
“temporal grain size” relative to larger verteb-
6 Although subjective agents may move in subjective time relative to
objective time in varying sized steps, it does not appear that there is
necessarily a single temporal grain size for the processing of all sens-
ory  stimuli.  Specifically,  Pöppel (1997) finds  that  the duration of
what constitutes a single moment (as assessed by temporal discrim-
ination of successive sensory events) varies between sensory modalit-
ies. This observation seems potentially consistent with the suggestion
that even within a single individual there may be multiple distinct
conscious systems (Schooler et al. 2011; Zeki 2003) corresponding to
different sensory levels and systems.
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Figure 14: The breaking vases event is depicted as a block
universe, with the temporal dimension spatialized, and each
moment  corresponding  to  a  separate  “slice.”  Notice  that
there  is  no  way  to  depict  “now”  and  no  way  to  move
through it.
Figure 15: The breaking vases event is again depicted as a
block universe, with the addition of a second temporal di-
mension. The moving present is represented as successive il-
luminated  slices  that  progress  from moment  to  moment
through the block universe. Notice that witnessing move-
ment through the block universe requires an additional di-
mension of time as the standard dimension of objective time
is already dedicated to spatializing the block universe. See
http://open-mind.net/videomaterials/schooler-bottles-
loaf-1.mp4/view. 
Figure 13: An event of breaking vases as it would be ex-
perienced from a first-person perspective. See  http://open-
mind.net/videomaterials/schooler_bootle_loaf5.mp4/view.
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rates. Specifically,  Healy et al. (2013) report a
negative correlation between vertebrate size and
the highest rate at which they can detect the
flickering  of  a  light  (the  flicker  fusion  rate).
From  the  vantage  of  the  current  discussion,
these findings suggest that the consciousness of
smaller  animals  may move  through subjective
time relative to physical time at a faster rate
than larger animals. This may be why it is so
hard  to  swat  a  fly:  from its  vantage,  we  are
moving in slow motion. 
A critical question that arises in postulat-
ing an additional subjective dimension (or di-
mensions) of time is: what are the properties of
this dimension? I have left the answer to this
question intentionally vague as I believe under-
specification  leaves  greater  room to  flesh  out
the rudimentary idea in various possible ways.
With that said, it seems plausible that the sub-
jective temporal dimension(s) could correspond
to subjective informational states in the same
way that objective informational states corres-
pond to different moments of objective time. As
noted,  subjective  informational  states  are
aligned with but not identical to objective in-
formational states (recall Mary, the color scient-
ist). Moreover, current theories of neutral mon-
ism posit information as being one of the core
potential  interfaces  between the  objective and
the  subjective.  Thus,  characterizing  subjective
time as corresponding to distinct subjective in-
formational states that are aligned with but not
identical to objective informational states seems
a  promising  characterization  of  the  nexus
between the objective and the subjective.
A further potential benefit of the conjec-
ture that experience emerges from movement in
a subjective temporal dimension relative to ob-
jective time is that it provides a potential way
of conceptualizing the nature of  experience in
the universe. Many scholars throughout history,
and  particularly  those  sympathetic  to  neutral
monism,  have  articulated  some  type  of  pan-
psychic vision of nature, where all elements of
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Figure 16: The observer depicted in the standard block uni-
verse with two dimensions of space. In the standard block uni-
verse, the observer is static and exists simultaneously in all loc-
ations. There is an insufficient number of degrees of freedom for
the existence of a genuine now or movement in time. 
Figure  17:  The observer depicted in a standard block
universe with one dimension of space. As with the stand-
ard convention of depicting the block universe in two spa-
tial dimensions instead of three, the reduction to one spa-
tial dimension is useful for illustrative purposes. 
Figure  18:  The observer depicted moving through a dy-
namic block universe with one dimension of physical space
and the introduction of an additional subjective temporal
dimension. In this model, there are a sufficient number of
degrees of freedom to enable the observer to move in object-
ive time relative to subjective time. The present can also be
depicted  as  a  series  of  moments  extending in  subjective
time, objective time, and physical space. 
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matter are seen as partaking in some rudiment-
ary  experience  or  proto-experience.  Advocates
of some version of panpsychism include Spinoza
(1677/1985),  Leibniz (1989),  James (1909),
Bergson (1896/1912),  and  Whitehead (1929).
More  recent  adopters  of  this  view  include
Hameroff &  Powell (2009),  Chalmers (1995),
Hunt (2011,  2014),  Koch 2013,  Schooler et al.
(2011),  Skrbina (2005),  and  Strawson (2008).
The notion that the flow of  time emerges by
virtue of movement in a subjective temporal di-
mension relative to an objective one provides a
potential way of conceptualizing how all of mat-
ter may partake in experience at varying levels
of  complexity.  Accordingly,  if  experience
emerges by movement through a dimension of
subjective time relative to objective time, then
it seems quite plausible that elements associated
with all of matter may be on a shared traject-
ory through these two (or more) temporal di-
mensions, and thus may be enjoying some form
of experience. In other words, if  consciousness
emerges from something as potentially ubiquit-
ous as movement through an additional time di-
mension, then it seems plausible that all matter
could enjoy some modicum of experience.
Although the present view provides a way
of conceptualizing how matter might partake in
at least some rudimentary form of experience, it
need not suggest that all objects—collections of
matter—are themselves sentient beings. To use
Nagel’s (1974) terminology, there need be noth-
ing “that it is like to be” a rock, for example.
Rather, the claim is that at some level, the con-
stituent elements of a rock (and all other mater-
ial objects) partake in at least some very rudi-
mentary  kind  of  experience,  what  the
physicist/philosopher  Alfred North Whitehead
(1929) referred to as “actual entities”. In other
words,  according  to  the  panpsychic  tradition,
matter is constituted of collections of individual
elements each of which partake in some minimal
experience. The subjective state of these indi-
vidual  experiential  elements  (or  “actual  entit-
ies”) is presumed to be extremely simple, and
for the most part, when they combine, it is as-
sumed that they form “mere aggregates” that
do not  entail  a  higher-order  experience.  How-
ever, under some circumstances, and in particu-
lar when present in certain organic structures,
these  simple  actual  entities  may  combine  to
form higher-order actual entities corresponding
to  the  conscious  agents  that  we typically  ac-
knowledge as such. 
The notion  of  observers  moving  through
objective time relative to a subjective temporal
dimension may offer a possible direction toward
solving the perennial “combination problem” of
panpsychism, namely discerning how rudiment-
ary proto-experiences of individual elements can
combine to form the larger higher -order experi-
ences that we enjoy (Hunt 2011). Accordingly, it
seems possible that experience may correspond
to oscillations in objective time relative to sub-
jective time. As depicted in Figures 18 and 19, I
have  speculated  that  observers  may  move  in
subjective time relative to objective time in dis-
crete steps.  The precise  timing of  these steps
from one moment to the next could potentially
provide the foundation for a unified experience
among elements (i.e., an approach to the com-
bination problem). When elements oscillate in
synchrony (i.e.,  when they all  jump from one
moment  in  subjective  time  to  the  next),  this
may produce  a unity  of  conscious  experience.
Nervous systems may provide an organizational
structure that enables material elements to os-
cillate in synchrony and thereby produce larger,
more organized fields of subjective experience.
In this sense, the combination problem may be
addressed by, and our holistic experience may
result from, the common wavelength of oscilla-
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Figure  19:  Two observers  depicted moving through a
dynamic block universe. Notice how this account enables
varying temporal grain sizes between observers.
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tion through objective time relative to subject-
ive time that constituent elements of a singular
experience partake in. Put colloquially, each of
us may have our own unique wavelength moving
through  subjective  time  relative  to  objective
time.
Importantly, these speculations are presen-
ted as an example of the kind of meta-perspect-
ive  that  might  enable an acknowledgement of
the reality of both first- and third-person vant-
ages.  This  is  far  from  a  formal  model,  and
leaves much unspecified. For example, although
I believe it could be possible to formalize the re-
lationship between subjective time and informa-
tional states, this remains a major conjecture.
Other elements of the framework, such as the
notion that observers move in discrete steps in
subjective and objective time, and that the pat-
tern  of  oscillation  may provide  a  way of  ad-
dressing  the  “combination  problem,”  also  are
merely conjectures. I suspect that there are po-
tentially a great variety of ways of conceptualiz-
ing how observers might move in a dimension of
subjective time relative to objective time.  My
goal in attempting a rudimentary depiction of
this notion is simply to fuel the conversation.7
Even if  scientists resist the suggestion of
an  additional  temporal  dimension  of  reality,
characterizing  how experience  can reside  in  a
physical world will require explicating how ob-
servers  move  in  physical  time  relative  to
changes  in  subjectively  apprehended  informa-
tion. In other words, to be an observer in reality
is arguably to reside in a now that corresponds
7 Several  years  ago,  I  presented the  idea  that  consciousness  entails
movement through a subjective dimension of time using the depic-
tion  in  Figure  15 and  illustrated  at  the  site:  http://open-
mind.net/videomaterials/schooler-bottles-loaf-1.mp4/view.  One  of
the  attendees,  Robert  Forman  (see  his  description  of  the  event,
Forman 2008), suggested that although he was intrigued by my de-
piction, that it did not square with his intuitions. In my model, the
block universe is fixed and consciousness marches through it. He sug-
gested that his intuition was the opposite: namely that the field of
the observer remains fixed and time passes by, or changes within it.
This alternative vantage in which time evolves through a fixed ob-
server seems a worthy alternative perspective for conceptualizing the
ever  -changing  now that  may be  closer  to  approximating  several
other  neutral  monist  vantages  (e.g.,  Whitehead 1929,  and  Hunt
2014). While I think this alternative viewpoint is worthy of consider-
ation, I also think it is likely that the two vantages are logically equi-
valent—it is simply a question of which one is taken as the fixed
frame of reference. Nevertheless the manner in which we construe the
movement of time relative to the individual may have important psy-
chological consequences (Casasanto & Boroditsky 2008).
to a “location” within continually changing in-
formation states. Thus, conceptualizing the ex-
perience of the observer requires understanding
how that observer moves between informational
states over time. Given that the present prevail-
ing view of physics does not afford the degrees
of  freedom to  actually  move  in  time,  under-
standing how an observer changes informational
states  relative  to  time  seems  to  require  at  a
minimum the postulation of a virtual dimension
of subjective time. Whether that dimension is
given ontological status as a genuine aspect of
reality depends on one’s perspective, but that of
course is precisely the point.
For those who are willing to entertain the
possibility of the kind of meta-perspective that
I am envisioning, there are a number of possible
ways forward. Perhaps, and most dramatically,
it seems plausible that the existence of an addi-
tional temporal dimension may have empirical
consequences.  Although  received  with  under-
standable skepticism, evidence continues to ac-
cumulate for precognition (i.e., that the mind is
sensitive to events that have not yet occurred).
There is a long tradition of research in this area
(Honorton &  Ferrari 1989). For example,  Bem
(2011) recently published a series of nine studies
in a highly respected journal that seem to sug-
gest evidence of genuine precognition and a sub-
sequent meta-analysis of 90 additional findings
appear  to  further  substantiate  these  findings
(Bem et al. 2014). Not surprisingly, these claims
have  been  met  with  considerable  skepticism
(e.g.,  Ritchie et  al. 2012;  Wagenmakers et  al.
2011).  Given  their  profound  challenge  to  our
current  scientific  understanding  of  reality,
claims of this sort will require studies that offer
highly tangible evidence that cannot be attrib-
uted to artifact or statistical anomaly, e.g., tak-
ing  advantage  of  people’s  alleged  precognitive
capacities to make consistent future predictions
of real world events, such as the future outcome
of  roulette  wheel  spins  or  the  stock  market
(Franklin et  al. in  press).  Nevertheless,  the
demonstration of robust findings of precognition
might provide the type of data that could in-
form  theories  of  how  consciousness  interfaces
with time in a manner not currently considered
in modern science. 
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Other approaches for fleshing out the kind
of meta-perspective suggested here may include
quantitative reconceptualization of existing find-
ings. Although quantum theory is one of the most
precisely predictive theories ever conceived, its ex-
planation remains a mystery. In particular,  the
manner  in  which  measurement  seems  to  affect
outcomes,  and  the  theoretical  relationship
between measurement, consciousness, and the col-
lapse of the wave function are not at all under-
stood (Chalmers 2002). It seems possible that the
postulation of an additional subjective dimension
of time might lead to alternative ways of concep-
tualizing current formalism.8 Indeed it seems pos-
sible that once psychological constructs (such as a
dimension of subjective time) are integrated with
physical principles, that new psycho/physical laws
of  nature  may  emerge  (Chalmers 2002;  J. N.
Schooler 2010).  Alternatively,  the  notion  that
subjective  experience  emerges  from  movement
through another dimension of time may resist em-
pirical documentation, but may nevertheless re-
main a conjecture that appeals to some intuitions
but not others. 
Even if  ultimately there is  no conclusive
ways of determining whether there exists an ad-
8 Although not a mathematician it seems plausible to me that exist-
ing  mathematical  formalisms  might be adopted to  accommodate
some of the present conjectures. Most speculatively, a quantitative
characterization of additional dimensions of time might correspond
in some manner to the many worlds account of quantum mechanics
(Everett 1957) that postulates that every potential alternative out-
come of quantum events entails a different branching parallel uni-
verse. It strikes me as possible that these so called “many worlds”
could correspond to different coordinates in additional temporal di-
mensions. From this vantage, the block universe might be better
conceived of as a block multiverse, with innumerable distinct tem-
poral  projections.  Several  multi-dimensional  theories  of  objective
time might (e.g., Bars et al. 1998; Craig & Weinstein 2008) also be
relevant. Also potentially pertinent are various existing quantitat-
ive  efforts  to  reconcile  experience  and  physical  matter.  For  ex-
ample, the magnitude of a conscious observer’s extension in sub-
jective time might correspond to  Tononi’s (2008) quantitative as-
sessment of Φ (pronounced “fi”) which he characterizes as corres-
ponding to the amount of integrated information that a conscious
observer apprehends at any particular moment. Other potentially
relevant formal approaches for reconciling consciousness with phys-
ical matter include: Hameroff & Penrose’s (2014) efforts to explain
how consciousness may “consists of a sequence of discrete events,
each being a moment of ‘objective reduction’ (OR) of a quantum
state” (p. 73), and  Tegmark’s (2014) suggestion that “conscious-
ness can be understood as a state of matter, ‘perceptronium’, with
distinctive information processing abilities” (p. 1). The relevance of
these  various  approaches  is  highly  speculative,  and indeed given
their disparities it is unlikely that they could be mutually accom-
modated. My point in mentioning them is simply to point the way
towards some more formal approaches  that might hold potential
for advancing this discussion.
ditional subjective dimension of time this does
not mean that the consideration or rejection of
this view should be arbitrary. There are many
judgments in life that rely on leanings that are
not purely objective in nature. From ethics to
art we routinely favor some views over others
for  reasons  besides  purely  objective  facts.  In-
deed the adoption or rejection of views close to
those under discussion here are often based on
subjective  considerations.  For  example  some
physicists embrace string theory because of the
elegance of its mathematics, whereas others re-
ject it because there is no physical evidence to
support  it.  Similarly there is  great  debate on
how far down the phylogenetic scale we should
postulate the existence of  consciousness.  Most
of us have an opinion on this matter, but it re-
mains entirely unclear whether there will ever
be a purely objective way to resolve it. In the
absence of objective evidence, our positions on
these issues are far from arbitrary, rather they
are based on the same sorts of sensibilities and
intuitions  that  underpin  many  of  our  most
heartfelt convictions. 
In a final further effort to appeal to read-
ers’ intuitions, let me introduce one last meta-
phor for the meta-perspective I am striving for:
consider the allegorical tale of Flatland, written
by  Edwin Abbott (1885) more than a century
ago. Flatland depicts a two-dimensional world
that is visited by a three-dimensional being (a
sphere). The sphere takes a citizen of Flatland
(a square) on a journey through the third di-
mension, offering the square a vantage on his
reality that he never had before. The story of
Flatland offers  a number of  useful lessons for
the  present  discussion.  First,  it  provides  a
powerful metaphor for thinking about the exist-
ence of  additional  dimensions of  reality.  Long
preceding  relativity  theory,  which  treats  time
like a fourth dimension, or string theory, which
currently posits the existence of up to seven ad-
ditional spatial dimensions (Greene 2004), Ab-
bott’s  tale  introduces  us  to  the  concept  of
higher-order dimensions. Flatland describes how
additional dimensions can be both embedded in
and  yet  simultaneously  transcend  what  we
know.  The  parallels  to  consciousness  are  also
striking: when the square is taken through the
Schooler, J. (2015). Bridging the Objective/Subjective Divide - Towards a Meta-Perspective of Science and Experience.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 34(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570405 32 | 40
www.open-mind.net
third dimension, he suddenly sees inside the ob-
jects of Flatland. Like consciousness, movement
in an additional dimension in Flatland enables
the perception of  an inside where none could
otherwise be possible. Like consciousness’s rela-
tionship to reality, an additional dimension in-
tersects  with the lower dimensions and yet is
distinct from them. And like the recognition of
an  additional  dimension  in  Flatland,  positing
consciousness as moving through objective time
relative to a dimension (or dimensions) of sub-
jective time provides an example of a meta-per-
spective that potentially offers observers a new
way of  conceptualizing  their  relationship  with
physical reality. Although I make no claims as
to having fleshed out this meta-perspective, it is
my hope that my arguments have persuaded at
least some readers  that it  is  a vantage worth
considering.
5 Summary and final conclusions
In this paper I used the thesis that perspective
shifting  can fundamentally  alter  how we con-
ceive and evaluate evidence as the backdrop for
exploring one of the most perennial and challen-
ging of all perspectives shifts: namely, between
the  subjective  first-person  perspective  that
provides each of us with a unique window onto
reality, and the objective third-person perspect-
ive that serves as the consensual foundation for
science. My arguments were divided into three
sections,  which  though  admittedly  distinct  in
their focus, all converge in attempting to elucid-
ate a rapprochement between the subjective and
objective perspectives on human experience.
In the first section I introduced the notion
of perspective shifting in the context of classic
reversible images. Here I argued that reversible
images  provide  a  context  for  conceptualizing
how the very same situation can be understood
from two very different perspectives that appear
to produce seemingly irreconcilable accounts of
their contents. However, once this juxtaposition
is recognized, a meta-perspective emerges that
enables  the  appreciation  of  both  perspectives
even if  they cannot be apprehended simultan-
eously. The perspective shifting and meta-per-
spective  that  arise  from  reversible  images
provide a metaphor for conceptualizing the ten-
sion  between  the  first-  and  third-person  per-
spective  for  understanding  human  experience.
Both researcher  and the field  of  science  itself
have been divided on whether to take perspect-
ives on human nature that emphasize inner ex-
perience or external behaviors. While historic-
ally this has been a debate on which researchers
have been forced to take sides, I argue that we
should  strive  towards  a  meta-perspective  in
which the two vantages can inform one another.
In the second section I sought to show how
the third-person perspective of objective science
can elucidate our understanding of first-person
experience. Towards this end, I introduced the
distinction  between having  an  experience  (ex-
periential consciousness) and one’s explicit un-
derstanding  of  that  experience  (meta-aware-
ness). Historically when researchers have sought
to understand people’s  actual  experience they
have relied on people’s self-reports about what
they believe they were experiencing.  This  has
led some to argue that it is impossible to gain
insight  into underlying experience.  However,  I
argue that through triangulation between self-
reports and behavioral and physiological meas-
ures, it is possible to make reasoned inferences
about  people’s  actual  experience;  identifying
both situations in which meta-awareness over-
looks  experience  (temporal  dissociations  of
meta-awareness) and cases in which it distorts
them (translations dissociations of meta-aware-
ness). This framework was fleshed out within an
extensive review of research on mind-wandering
that,  because of  its  inherently private nature,
provides an ideal testing ground for developing
a third-person science of first-person experience.
By assessing the relationship between people’s
behavioral and physiological measures and self-
report this review concludes that while people’s
self-reports of mind-wandering routinely corres-
pond to genuinely experienced instances of this
mental state, they nevertheless often fail to no-
tice mind-wandering while it is occurring. 
In the final and most speculative section of
this paper, I turned the tables around. Instead of
asking how third-person science clarifies first-per-
son experience, I asked how first-person experi-
ence may inform third-person science. Here I ar-
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gued that there are certain aspects of first-person
experience that are so fundamental that they may
reasonably serve as axioms of existence that any
construal of physical reality must be able to ac-
commodate. As detailed in the prior section it is
clear that many aspects of experience may be il-
lusory but several can reasonably be construed as
unassailable, including: the occurrence of experi-
ence, the flow of time and the privileged present.
Notably, current accounts of physical reality offer
no way of accommodating these inherent aspects
of first-person experience. This conflict between
seemingly self-evident aspects of personal experi-
ence and current accounts of physical reality leads
me to posit that, like the reversible images that
can only be accommodated by recognizing a lar-
ger meta-perspective in which they both reside, so
too there must exist some meta-perspective that
can accommodate both objective scientific facts
and  personally  experienced  ones.  Towards  this
end I introduced a highly speculative conjecture
about the larger framework in which both object-
ive  and  subjective  perspectives  might  reside.
Namely  that  consciousness  involves  a  funda-
mental aspect of the universe that arises via the
changing informational states associated with an
observer’s movement through objective time relat-
ive to a currently unacknowledged dimension or
dimensions  of  subjective  time.  Although highly
speculative, I offer this account as an example of
the kind of meta-perspective that may simultan-
eously accommodate extant objective observations
and certain aspects of subjective experience that I
find as  compelling as the existence of  physical
reality itself.
In my view, bridging the objective/subject-
ive divide will require adopting a meta-perspect-
ive in which the two points of view are viewed as
alternative vantages on an underpinning reality
that corresponds to both but can be fully accom-
modated by neither alone. As I attempted to il-
lustrate at the outset, it is quite possible to hold
inaccurate or incomplete beliefs about one’s ex-
perience, and third-person science can help to il-
luminate such errors. However, from my vantage
there are certain elements of subjective experience
that are as axiomatic as any aspect of the phys-
ical realm. Nevertheless, I recognize that not all
will see it this way. Some will remain exclusively
fixed to the third-person perspective of objective
science, while others will conceive of reality ex-
clusively  from  their  own  personal  first-person
point of view. In conceptualizing this breadth of
perspectives, it is important to remain mindful of
an essential insight of Bayes’ theorem of probabil-
ity. Bayes’ theorem states that in calculating the
probability of something one must integrate new
evidence with one’s a priori probabilities. From a
Baysian perspective, for those who believe that
something is impossible (i.e.,  infinitely unlikely)
there is no amount of evidence or argument that
should sway them. The ontological reality of first-
person experience seems very much to fit in this
category. My arguments on this point will likely
remain wholly unpersuasive to those who cannot
conceive of  subjective experience as offering an
epistemological authority that rivals science. How-
ever, for those open to the possibility that science
will need to find a way to accommodate the real-
ity of both the subjective and objective perspect-
ives, I hope my discussion offers some glimmers as
to what such a meta-perspective might be like.
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